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That aggression has been a problem from the earliest account of 
man, one need only turn to the initial pages of Genesis to find recorded 
the murder of Abel by Cain. Or if that is not convincing, then one can 
inspect early primitive sketches of genocide that have more recently 
come to light. A cursory scanning of any world history book serves as 
a reminder that aggression and violence-have never known a respite 
throughout the many ages of man. 
While historians have recorded it, ministers damned it, philoso-
phers analyzed it; not until Freud did psychiatrists dare to look it in 
the face. Even at that his view was so pessimistic that psychologists 
barely looked up from their mazes to take notice. Not until 1939 with 
the publication of Frustration and Aggression by the Yale group of 
Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939) did social scientists 
seriously attack this age old problem. Most of their initial work and 
the studies that followed were done on animals, with most of the 
research on human aggression being done in the last ten years (Singer, 
1971). 
That psychologists now view the study of aggression as well within 
their province can be attested to by the recent number of conferences 
being held (e.g., the Center for Studies in Cognition and Affect at the 
Graduate Center of the City University of New York) and the number of 
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books being published that have as their aim to inform, guide, and 
stimulate further research on this topic (e.g., Berkowitz, 1969; 
Megargee and Hokanson, 1970; Ellis and Gullo, 1971; Singer, 1971). This 
awakened interest and productivity would suggest that as Singer (1971) 
has noted, the "denial" of the existence of a crucial problem by social 
scientists has been ended. 
Much of the work on human aggression that followed in the wake of 
the publication of Frustration and Aggression (Dollard et al., 1939) set 
about to confirm, deny, modify, or extend the hypotheses articulated by 
the Yale group. The three formulations that have received the most 
attention are: 
(1) aggression is always a consequence of frustration 
(2) frustration always leads to some form of aggression 
(3) the occurrence of any act of aggression is assumed to 
reduce the instigation to aggression (catharsis 
hypothesis) (Dollard et al., 1939). 
Underlying these hypothesis is the concept of aggression as a drive 
which is a reformulation of Freud's notion of aggression as an instinct 
which he labeled Thanatos. This is viewed as an inevitable disposition 
of man which creates a rising pressure needing discharge periodically or 
diversion to other channels to slow the pressure for discharge. Buss 
(1961) examines the arguments posed by Freud and other writers for this 
view and concludes: 
• none of the arguments for the presence of an instinct of 
aggression seems to stand up under analysis. There is a 
sparsity of evidence for the notion; for the present it seems 
best to reject the idea of an instinct of aggression. 
Berkowitz (1969) has reviewed the experimental literature which 
has led to a lively controversy over whether aggression is a drive 
pressing for release as a result of frustration. Despite the fact that 
the literature remains inconclusive, the implications of this view, as 
several writers have noted (Berkowitz, 1962; Dennenberg and Zarrow, 
1970) are in the least, disconcerting. In commenting on Freud's anal~ 
ysis (see Freud's letter to Einstein in Megargee and Hokanson, 1970), 
Berkowitz:comments: 
(Freud stated) 1Man 1 s energies must continually seek release. 
If they did not find any outlet in one turn, they supposedly 
would be expressed in some other manner. Assertiveness and 
competition might drain some of his destructive force, but 
if they did not, less desirable outlets would be found.' 
Berkowitz responds to this analysis 1 If the death instinct 
directed outward produced wars, a nation which did not fight 
and had no alternatives must destroy itself. Thus war could 
be seen as a needed safety valve, a country's attempt at 
self preservation. A gloomy prospect •••• • 
And in reference to the more biological animal work of geneticists 
and etologists, Dennenberg and Zarrow (1970) note that for these 
theorists: 
Man is considered to have an inborn predisposition for aggres-
sion; (2) aggression may be as inborn and natural as sex 
behavior; (J) man is a territorial animal who will fight to 
take over new territories; (4) because of the genetic basis 
of aggression, little can be done to modify this behavior in 
man. A frighteningly simple deduction follows from these 
few points: since the birth rate is increasing the popula-
tion density at an exponential rate, ••• since tensions • 
• • are on the increase ••• and since we have been unable 
to find ways to control aggression, it therefore follows that 
an inherited aggressive nature will ultimately lead to the 
destruction of mankind. 
The pessimism engendered by this view, especially as the need has 
become more pressing to find means to control or reduce aggression has 
led other theorists and investigators to view "aggressive behavior as 
an expression of one of man's broad repertory of potential reactions to 
a variety of external circumstances" (Singer, 1971, p. 4). 
J 
In organizing a conference on aggression at the Center for Research 
in Cognition and Affect at the City University of New York, Singer 
(1971, p. 2) states that the purpose was to: 
••• make some contribution to the question of how aggres-
sive behavior can be controlled, limited, or eliminated by a 
fuller understanding of, its nature in relation to the ways 
in which man 'organizes the complex information from his 
enyironment and reacts affectively while carrying on this 
fundamental organismic operation. 
Thus, an important conference consisting of major researchers in 
the field of aggress:i,on stressed the importance of "the way in which 
the interpretation of situations (a cognitive function) interacts with 
a limited but differentiated affect system in producing an ultimate 
motor reaction" (Singer, 1971, p. 4.). 
This approach to the study of anger and aggression might best be 
characterized as a cognitive-learning view. This view emphasizes that 
the probability, intensity, and quality of emotion and behavior is 
determined jointly by predispositional factors, classical and operant 
conditioning (e.g., Hokanson, Willers, and Koropsak, 1968), cognitive 
appraisal (Arnold, 1970; Ellis, ,1962; Lazarus, 1970) and philosophical 
beliefs (Peters, 1970; Ellis, 1962). Thus, there is no fixed connection 
between classes of stimuli, emotions, and behavior (Landau, 1972). 
At least three things follow from this general position: 
(1) Since a large part of emotion and behavior is shaped and 
maintained by its consequences, whether an aggressive act 
reduces tension (produces relief) will depend on whether 
' ' 
the source of tension is eliminated or whether the aggres-
sive act produces positive or negative reinforcement, 
frustration, or punishment. Thus, cognitive-learning 
theorists would state that aggression may lead to relief, 
no change, or an increase in physiological and experienced 
relief. 
(2) Aggressive behavior which is reinforced, either by 
terminating aversive events (for example, frustration) 
reducing tension, or more positively by attaining a goal 
or group approval will establish, maintain, and strengthen 
aggressive habits. 
(3) Cognitive beliefs and evaluation processes affect both 
emotional arousal (anger) and instigations to behavior 
(aggression). 
These three aspects of the cognitive-learning view have already 
had an impact on applications of psychotherapy procedure. Ellis (1962) 
articulated his approach to psychotherapy which is known as Rational-
Emotive Therapy (RET). He emphasized both the cognitive and behavioral 
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components involved in therapeutic change. With respect to aggression, 
clients are encouraged to become aware of their anger and their thoughts 
which relate to their experience, however, clients are not encouraged 
to express their anger as part of their treatment. They are, rather, 
strongly encouraged and specifically trained to think a different 
philosophy, imagine a new feeling, and behave in non-self defeating 
ways (e.g., assertively, rather than aggressively). The training pro-
cedures involve philosophical-logical challenges to the clients' phi-
losophy and ideas, behavioral rehearsal (modeling), aggression-assertion 
discrimination, as well as homework assignments. It should be empha-
sized that the client is not encouraged to express his anger in the 
sense that verbal and behavioral aggression is not modeled, reinforced, 
or assigned as homework (Lana.au, 1972). 
Rational-Emotive therapy is not alone in applying a cognitive-
learning analysis to psychotherapeutic procedures. Murry and Jacobson 
(1970) in an extensive review of learning theory and behavior therapy 
demonstrate that the learning occurring in the behavior therapies in-
volves complex cognitive, emotional, and motivational changes operating 
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in a social context. They conclude that the explanations of behavior 
therapists do not adequately recognize the importance of cognitive and 
emotional response systems operating in interpersonal relationships. 
Meyer and Chesser (1970) in a recent book on behavior therapy devoted a 
whole chapter to cognitive processes in therapy emphasizing the impor-
tance of both a cognitive and a behavioral analysis of client problems. 
This emphasis is seen even more clearly in recent work by Lazarus (1970) 
and Meichenbaum (1972) who are attempting to integrate the Rational-
Emotive system of Ellis with behavior modification techniques. 
While the cognitive-behavioral approach has been shown to be 
effective with a variety of problems including interpersonal anxiety 
(Di Loreto, 1968), anticipatory anxiety (Burkhead, 1970), impulsive 
behavior in children (Meichenbaum, 1971), snake phobias (Meichenbaum, 
1971), and smoking (Meichenbaum, 1970), there has been very little 
direct support to determine. whether this approach would also be effec-
tive in reducing anger and aggression. The evidence there is comes 
from one-shot experimental designs that vary pre training conditions 
(Davitz, 1951), model behavior (Chittenden, 1942; Bandura, 1969, 1971), 
perceptual sets (Berkowitz, 1968; Geen and Berkowitz, 1967; Burnstein 
and Worchel, 1962) and reinforcement contingencies (Buss, 1971; Hokanson 
and Edelman, 1966; Hokanson, Willers, and Koropsak, 1968). 
The purpose of this study was to test directly the effectiveness of 
cognitive-learning procedures derived from Ellis' Rational-Emotive 
system in their application to the reduction of anger and aggression. 
To do this, a training program was developed based on cognitive-
linguistic procedures outlined by Ellis or derived from his system. 
More specifically, subjects were chosen who evidenced an above-
average level of anger and aggressive responding and were given four 
hours of training aimed at identifying anger producing cognitions and 
generating new non-anger producing cognitions. After which, they 
received four hours of assertion-aggression discrimination training 
with the purpose of increasing their awareness of situations in which 
they tended to act aggressively and learning assertive rather than 
aggressive responses to those situations. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In considering the problem under investigation, theoretical as 
well as empirical literature will be reviewed evaluating cognitive 
aspects of anger and aggression, learning aspects of anger and aggres-
sion, Rational-Emotive theory and analysis of anger and aggression. In 
addition, studies will be reviewed to assess the efficacy of Rational-
Emotive approaches to behavioral change as well as the effectiveness of 
assertive training techniques in training alternative behaviors. 
Cognition and Anger 
While there is probably no theorist who would take the radical 
position that all anger, or any emotion for that matter, is totally 
determined by cognition, there are those who view the study of anger 
and emotion in man grossly inadequate without an emphasis on man's 
perceptual-evaluative processes. Thus, Peters (1970) criticizes 
behaviorism for its: "· •• methodological puritanism and conceptual 
confusion. of scientific method which has among other historical 
traditions (e.g., animal work) truly limited the study of emotions." 
Not denying the importance of studying physiological arousal or emo-
tional expressions, Peters argues that the most important features of 
• emotions (and motives) has been missed by the psychologist; cognitive 
appraisal and beliefs. Thus, Peters' main thesis is: 
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••• different appraisals are largely constitutive of dif-
ferent emotions. By that I mean that at least a logically 
necessary condition for the use of the word •emotion' is 
that some kind of appraisal should be involved, and that the 
different emotions must involve different appraisals. In 
other words, emotions are basically forms of cognitions. 
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Ewert (1970) differentiates between feelings and emotions assigning 
the former to a biological basis and the latter to social origins 
because they refer "to persons or situations relevant to persons." 
Emotions, ,then, are attitudes of the individual to his experienced 
social environment and have their origin in an evaluation of the social 
situation. In a study of the "negative phase" (restlessness, obstinacy, 
irritability, hatred of self and society, and hostility toward society) 
of adolescent girls using a questionnaire that he developed, :&v-ert found 
support for this thesis with his data demonstrating that the "negative 
phase" (heightened emotionality) was correlated with changing evalua-
tions of the social environment and increasing distance between the 
individual and his reference persons. 
In developing a cognitive theory of emotion, Lazarus et al. . ( 1970) 
draws on recent work in physiology (Douglas, 1967; Pribram, 1960; 
Leeper, 1965), social psychology {Schachte~ 1967), and anthropology 
(Segall et al., .1966) to demonstrate that evidence from these various 
disciplines is complementary rather than contradictory to a cognitive 
analysis of emotion. He states "emotions should be regarded as a func-
tion of cognitive activity, each particular emotion presumably asso-
ciated with a different evaluation" (p. 217). 
While Magna Arnold (1960) has emphasized the importance of the 
appraisal of the situation on emotional arousal, Lazarus (1970) extends 
her position by also including the importance of the evaluation of the 
possibilities for action as affecting the resultant emotion. This, 
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then, suggests two possible points of intervention in changing emotions: 
(1) a reevaluation of the situation and (2) an evaluation of alternative 
responses to the situation. 
Another line of evidence strongly substantiating the effect of cog-
nitive evaluation on emotion and emotional arousal has been the work of 
Schachter and his associates ( Schachter, 1966, 196~; Schachter and Singer, 
1962; Valins, 1966; Valins and Ray, 1967). Through a series of inge-. 
nious manipulations of the social context and the beliefs of subjects, 
they have shown that given the presence of physiological arousal, or 
the belief of it, that individuals will label or describe this state in 
terms of the cognitive set that the investigators manipulate. Thus, the 
same arousal can be interpreted as a variety of emotions (fear, anger, 
joy, love) depending on the social context in which it occurs. 
While transitory emotional experiences are important in the 
development of theory with cognitions certainly having an effect, of 
most interest to the concern of the reduction of anger and aggression 
are the more transituational determinants of anger such that the fre-
quency of cognitive evaluations leading to anger are what pose problems 
both for the individual and society. With this concern in mind, Buss 
(1961) considers the overriding attitude which he labels hostility. He 
defines this "an implicit verbal response involving negative feelings 
(ill will) and negative evaluations of people and events." He points 
out that even after an emotional response subsides, the negative eval-
uation responses remain. These, then, become a more enduring or char-
acteristic way of perceiving classes of stimuli and have the possibility 
of generalizing to other stimuli. 
Ellis (1962) corroborates this view in identifying "philosophical 
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beliefs" that give rise to emotional disturbance. He differentiates 
these from perceptions in viewing beliefs as a more enduring tendency 
which affect an .individual in a variety of situations. The major thrust 
of his theoretical writings has been in the identification of these 
"philosophical beliefs" which affect the individuals' perceptions in a 
variety of circumstances and demonstrating how these are related to 
negative emotions such as anger and anxiety. 
Recent experimental work investigating laboratory analogs of 
aggressive interaction (Pisano and Taylor, 1971; Taylor, 1967; Taylor 
and Epstein, 1967; Hokanson and Burgess, 1962; Hokanson and Edelman, 
1966) have begun to be able to differentiate between individuals who 
characteristically respond aggressively and those who will respond 
aggressively only under certain conditions. The work of Megargee (1971) 
with prisoners in which he poses an underlying hostility model to 
explain violent crimes is also interesting in this regard. Thus, there 
is increasing interest and focus on those individuals who have a higher 
probability of acting aggressively in a number of situations. 
Several points can be drawn from this review of the cognitive 
aspects of emotion relative to the study of anger. 
(1) Cognitive appraisal of persons or situations is important 
to the arousal of anger. 
(2) Cognitive evaluation of perceived alternatives effect the 
experience of anger. 
(3) Attitudes and beliefs effect the frequency with which 
situations will be appraised or evaluated in such a way 
as to arouse anger. 
In order to effect the reduction of anger, there are, then, at 
least three points of intervention: 
( 1) Reappraising the1 situation. 
(2) Evaluating alternative actions. 
(3) Changing attitudes and beliefs. 
Feshbach (1964:) and Kaufman (1965) in their reviews on anger and 
aggression pose similar analyses of intervention points. 
Cognitive Aspects of Aggressive Behavior 
While a brief rationale has been presented for considering the 
cognitive aspects of emotion, i.e., anger, it is equally important to 
consider the cognitive elements of behavior, i.e., aggression. The 
importance of demonstrating the cognitive links to both emotion and 
behavior ~hould be self evident. For herein lies an important means 
of intervention in reducing both anger and aggression-changing atti-
tudes, evaluations, and perceptions. 
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The evidence pointing to cognitive-perceptual processes effecting 
behavior comes from a variety of sources. Valins and Ray (1967) in an 
ingenious experiment manipulated heartbeat feedback to snake phobic 
subjects. Those who heard what they thought to be their heartbeats were 
not aroused in the presence of snakes when the feedback they received 
("bogus heartbeats") indicated that they were not aroused. Under this 
condition, they actually decreased their avoidance of snakes. In other 
words, thinking they were not afraid led the subjects to act as though 
they were not afraid. 
Meichenbaum (1966, 1971) working with impulsive children hypothe-
sized that they would manifest less verbal control over their behavior 
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and would use internal speech in a less instrumental fashion. Using a 
paradigm developed by Luria, he developed a training program to enhance 
their ability to cognitively self-instruct themselves to be task rele-
vant. First_! modeled cognitive self-instruction aloud to.§., then.§. 
instructed himself first overtly then covertly. This training resulted 
in increased performance on the Porteus Maze test, performance IQ on 
the WISC, and on a measure of cognitive reflectivity. He also applied 
this technique to hospitalized schizophrenics and was able to signifi-
cantly reduce the number of bizarre or inappropriate statements made in 
interview situations. In this series of experiments, Meichenbaum 
effectively demonstrates the importance of cognitions in directing 
behavior. For other work corroborating this same thesis, see also 
Landau, 1971; Landau and Landau, 1969; and Lovaas, 1961. 
Turning more specifically to studies directly relating to aggres-
sion, Berkowitz (1969) provides direct sugport that interpretation or 
perception of stimuli effects aggression. S•s were given information 
via an "anger meter" to make them believe that they had experienced 
different degrees of anger. This "bogus" information later effected 
the magnitude of.§. aggressive responding in a frustrating situation. 
Berkowitz (1963, 1968) has also demonstrated that subjects wit-
nessing a violent film were more aggressive if a cognitive set was 
employed that justified the violence or if an association was made 
between the person in the film and the frustrator (confederate). He 
concluded that violent movies which provide a justification or incentive 
for violence can under some circumstances .increase the likelihood for 
aggressive behavior. Support for the notion of interpretation and 
consequence effects on behavior comes from a pair of related experiments 
t 
by Lazarus (1964, 1965). He manipulated cognitive set by altering 
sound tracks and providing orientation passages to S's seeing the 
"Subincision" film. He found that this same potentially disturbing 
movie produced varying degrees of stress reaction depending on how S 1 s 
interpreted it. 
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Another line of evidence supporting the importance of cognitive-
perceptual processes in aggression comes from several studies illumi--
nating what Staub (1971) refers to as "the need for reciprocity." This 
refers to aggressive behavior motivated by a desire to balance physical 
or psychological harm and by the perception of unfairness or injustice. 
Children were shown to be less willing to share with a child who pre-
viously had been selfish (Staub and Sherk, 1970). Female subjects were 
more willing to receive shock when their partner received shocks, even 
though it was through no fault of their own (Rawlings, 1968). Thus, the 
concepts of justice and fairness (cognitive constructs) and the percep-
tion of these in situations can also effect aggressive behavior. 
In addition, the motives of the person inflicting harm determine 
the victims reactions. If frustration is perceived as arbitrary, there 
is a greater likelihood that the victim will react aggressively. In a 
study by Burnstein and Worchel _( 1962), subjects in a group were pre-
vented from reaching their goal of a unanimous decision by having one 
member continually interrupt and ask questions. In another condition, 
the group member acted in the same manner but, in addition, wore a 
hearing aid attesting to an obvious hearing defect. On measures of 
aggression, the first group was significantly more aggressive. 
In a similar vein, Mallick and McCandless (1966) investigating the 
effect of intent on subsequent aggression had third grade children 
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frustrated by older children who interfered with the completion of tasks 
which deprived the~•s of winning money. Subsequent aggression (retali-
ation) was significantly reduced when the frustrators 1 behavior was 
explained to the children as not malicious in intent, but mainly the 
result of tiredness and clumsiness. For related studies, see also 
Pastore (1952) and Fishman (1965). 
This review has illuminated at least two ways in which cognitive 
appraisal effe.cts aggressive behavior: 
(1) Cognitive perception of the amount of anger experienced 
in a situation directly effects the amount of aggression 
expressed. 
(2) Cognitive sets can provide a justification for aggres-
sion and thereby increase it. 
(a) perceptions and beliefs regarding fairness and 
justice effect the amount of aggression a person 
will express in a given situation. 
(b) Beliefs about intention to harm or perceptions of 
arbitrarin~ss of frustration effect the amount of 
aggression that will be displayed. 
In considering the modification and reduction of aggression, 
Feshbach (196~) as well as Kaufman (1965) and Pepitone (196~) consider 
that a reevaluation of the stimulus eliciting hostility is the most 
effective means of reducing aggression. Feshbach (196~) points out 
that once the meaning of a particular stimulus has changed, the stim-
ulus situation has changed which evokes a new response. Therefore, the 
major point of intervention in the above cognitive instigations to 
aggression would be a reinterpretation of the stimulus to set up 
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alternative modes of action. Thus, an individual could be taught that 
his perception of his anger could serve as a cue for alternative 
behaviors (i.e., assertiveness, problem solving) or could serve as a cue 
that he is interpreting a situation as more threatening than in 
actuality it is. 
Just as an individual can be provided with a cognitive rationale 
justifying aggression, it would seem logical to assume that cognitive 
reappraisal can be used to minimize aggression. Perceptions of unfair-
ness and injustice could provide stimuli for alternative behaviors 
(assertiveness, problem solving). Finally, perceptions of intent to 
harm or thwart could be open to other interpretations and courses of 
action. 
Learning Aspects of Anger 
It is important for the thesis of this paper to consider at least 
some of the ways in which learning effects anger. This does not pre-
clude the effect of such physiological factors as hormonal levels, 
metabolic rates, or inherent reactivity (see Moyer, 1971) but rather 
focuses on those factors which are often overlooked in theories of 
emotion which appear to be important both theoretically and clinically. 
This discussion will attempt to illuminate how cultural perspectives, 
classical conditioning, and instrumental learning effect anger. 
There are three important ways that culture effects anger; 
through the perception or appraisal of emotional stimuli, the shaping 
of social relationships, and the influencing of systems of judgment 
(Lazarus, 1970). 
There are numerous anecdotal stories of stimuli being fear inducing 
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in one culture and anger inducing in another. For example, in India 
if someone stealthily kills a "sacred cow" in the middle of the night 
this might set off in him fears of recrimination from the gods; on the 
other hand, if this same event were to occur in West Texas, it would 
likely raise the ire of the victimized cattle baron. In addition, 
Lazarus (1970) reports data that show cultural influences on perception 
affecting such things as optical illusions and responses to pain! 
Furthe~ Schachter (1967) has demonstrated the importance of social con-
text on the interpretation of bodily states during arousal. These 
various reports suggest that there are common culturally shaped percep-
tions and evaluations of stimuli that give rise to specific emotional 
responses and that these are learned as a function of being a member of 
that culture. It would, therefore, be important to identify some of 
the frequently occurring perceptions or evaluations of situations that 
give rise to fee.lings of anger. Preliminary work has been carried out 
by Doering et al. (1962) on perceptions and Ellis (1962) has articulated 
a series of evaluations that commonly occur in this culture that elicit 
feelings of anger. These will be described in detail in a .latter sec-
tion of this chapter. 
The shaping of social relationships can be seen by such examples 
as the caste system in India, permissive sexual attitudes among Poly-
nesian groups, and the Quaker tradition of early separation of the 
sexes. The values inherent in each of these cultures determine what 
will be seen as "good" or ''bad, 11 "right" or 11wrong 11 behavior. So that 
having more than one wife in Uganda will elicit a very different 
response in that culture than the discovery of a man married to more 
than one woman would in this culture. 
This can be seen even more dramatically in Mead's report of the 
Mundugomor and the Arapesh (Mead, 1935). In the one culture, adults 
are very hostile toward children and, in general, are vengeful and 
aggressive in their social relationships. In the other, they are very 
affectionate toward their children and generally are cooperative and 
mild mannered. The most parsimonious explanation for these dramtic 
differences is that the predominant attitudes and values differ in the 
two cultures and are acquired through a social learning process. 
That cultural context effects systems of judgment can be seen 
clearly in the Japanese concept of amae which has no exact Western 
translational equivalent. It means approximately a wish to be loved 
or a need for dependency but carries a positive connotation, not the 
neurotic meaning often ascribed here. Accordingly, the Japanese view 
this as a very basic emotion seen even in animals and they react with 
surprise that Western language is devoid of this concept (Lazarus, 
1970). 
Taken together then, these three aspects of cultural influence 
point to the role of learning via cultural norms or values and, in 
turn, demonstrate the impact of these learned values on emotion. 
Turning to another aspect of learning--classical conditioning, 
Kaufman (1965) poses this hypothesis regarding anger: 
Initially unlabled emotional arousal has in the past of an 
individual's experience been conditioned to stimulus situa~ 
tions regardless of subsequent responses. When such a 
stimulus situation recurs, so should the arousal which is 
then labeled anger in the manner described by Schacter and 
Singer (1962) (p. 356). 
Because anger may be conditioned in this manner, Kaufman (1965) 
cautions that it is not to be viewed as permanent or unalterable but 
becomes established only if it fulfills an instrumental role. As 
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Spence (1966, 1959) has shown in other classically conditioned responses 
(e.g., eye blink), these responses can be altered with changes in cog-
nitive awareness (for example, the decision not to blink). 
This suggests that while anger may be conditioned to certain 
classes of stimuli, this response can also be modified if: 
(1) it no longer is instrumental, 
(2) other responses are equally instrumental, 
(J) reevaluated under different cognitive sets. 
Another consideration in the learning aspects of anger is the 
instrumental functions it serves in reaching a goal (Lazarus, 1970). 
A typical example is the child who wants a piece of candy and may learn 
that to simply ask is to no avail, but th~owing a temper tantrum is 
highly effective. Therefore, he is reinforced for this behavior because 
it enables him to get what he wants. An individual who in the past has 
been rewarded for aggressive behavior may have learned that emotional 
arousal which he identified as anger.facilitated such aggressive behav-
ior so he, therefore, learns to work himself into a rage to energize his 
aggressive behavior. 
Patterson et al. (1967) in his study of aggressive boys noted that 
initially there was little evidence of anger, the boys learning that 
certain aggressive acts were successful in securing a goal. However, 
later, once the behaviors were learned, the evidence of emotional 
arousal was much more frequent. 
Kaufman (1965) poses an additional mechanism whereby anger may 
be instrumental. He suggests that anger, in some instances, may follow 
aggression as a guilt-reducing response. A person who feels guilty 
after having been aggressive rationalizes by producing anger. He. 
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states: "More generally, self stimulation to anger following aggres-
. 
sion may have dissonance or anxiety-reducing properties" (p. 356). 
In summarizing the various ways that anger can be learned, it 
becomes important to assess: 
(1) The cultural values and perceptions of stimuli that 
give rise to feelings of anger. 
(2) Classes of stimuli that have become conditioned· to 
anger arousal. 
(3) The instrumental value of anger responses. 
Learning Aspects of Aggressive Behavior 
In evaluating the learning aspects of aggression, it is important 
to identify the various ways that aggression has been demonstrated to 
be learned. Therefore, considerations will first be given to studies 
which illuminate reinforcement effects followed by reports of observa-
tional learning effects on aggression. 
Several studies have demonstrated that aggression can be increased 
by reinforcing an aggressive response. Children were reinforced for 
verbal aggression against dolls ("bad doll," "doll should be spanked") 
in a study by Lovaas (1961) and the number of such responses increased. 
Walters (Walters and Brown, 1963) reinforced children for striking a 
Bobo doll and the frequency of hitting rose. Walters (196~) also 
demonstrated that. women gave higher electric shocks to another person 
when rewarded for doing so. Buss (1971) further showed that college 
males would increase aggressive responding when rewarded for doing so 
by a confederate giving a "correct" response when they did so. A study 
by Doering et al. (1962) showed that both verbal aggression could be 
increased and t):J.en transferred to a new (but similar) test situation. 
This was also found in a study of role playing by Wagner (1968). 
What these studies suggest is that just as aggression can be 
learned through direct reinforcement, hypothetically aggression could 
be unlearned by the reverse process, i.e., reinforcing non-aggressive 
behaviors. This point will be elaborated in a later section of this 
chapter. 
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There is also evidence suggesting other types of reinforcers that 
operate on the learning of aggressive behavior. Buss (1961) argues that 
the reward may be internal as well as external, such as a sharp drop in 
anger levels. Studies by Hokanson and his colleagues provide indirect 
support for this hYPothesis (Hokanson and Burgess, 1962; Hokanson, 
Willers, and Koropsak, 1968). ~ thought he was interacting with a 
fellow subject (experimental accomplice). After S received one of the 
three responses (shock to finger tips, a light in his booth, or nothing 
- ignoring response) he was then signaled to respond. In addition to 
recording how~ responded to.each signal, vascular patterns (heart rate, 
blood volume) were also monitored. Thus, Hokanson was able to evaluate 
the nature of the response to aggression for both male and female sub-
jects and to assess the relationship between the response and vascular 
arousal reduction. The results of the experiments showed the following: 
(1) Male and female subjects showed vascular arousal after 
being shocked. 
(2) Males were more likely to respond to shock witl1 shock 
and exl1ibit rapid arousal reduction; furthermore, on 
those trials where they responded to shock with friendly 
(reward) responses, arousal reduction was slow. 
(3) Females, on the other hand, responded to shock with 
friendly responses and showed rapid arousal reduction; 
while ignoring or aggressive responses yielded slow 
arousal reduction. 
(4) When femi;l.les were punished for responding to shock with 
reward and rewarded for responding to shock with shock, 
they increased their number ~f counter aggressive 
responses and exhibited rapid arousal reduction. 
(5) Similarly, when males were punished for responding to 
shock with shock and rewarded for responding to shock 
with friendly responses, they exhibited rapid arousal 
reduction when they emitted friendly responses but their 
frequency of counter aggressive responses did not change 
(although with more trials they may have done so). 
In line with Buss's hypothesis, in the first part of the study 
males dropped in arousal after making an aggressive response which 
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might very well serve as a reinforcer and thereby explain the heightened 
number of aggressive responses in males. This gains additional support 
from the female data which did not show either reduction in arousal 
after an aggressive response or a high frequency of aggressive 
responses. Hokanson's own thesis is similar and is based on social 
learning principals. In brief, he speculates that males in this society 
are rewarded for acting aggressively (get what they want), whereas, 
females are most often rewarded for passive or docile behavior. 
The second part of the study is even more interesting with regard 
to the reduction of aggression. It clearly shows that aggressive re-
sponding can be modified through reinforcement of alternative behaviors. 
Related to studies showing direct reinforcement for aggressive 
behavior have been several studies showing the effects of pretraining 
on post frustration responding. Davitz (1952) conducted a study with 
seven to nine year old children who were divided into two groups. One 
group received aggressive training in which they played "Cover the 
Spot," Break the Ball," and 11Scalp. 11 For example, in "Cover the Spot" 
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a small "x" was placed on a mat and the children were told to cover the 
spot with some part of their body. It was emphasized that there were no 
rules limiting the amount of aggression. The other group was provided 
constructive pretraining tasks such as doing mural drawings or com~ 
pleting jigsaw puzzles. They then watched a film which was interrupted 
at the climatic point and put in a free play situation. The children 
who were given the aggressive pretraining experience were significantly 
more aggressive in the free play period. 
Related to this is the work of Bard (1971) with a small group of 
New York City policemen. A group was selected for training to handle 
the highly volatile family crisis calls received by the precinct. This 
program focused on giving information about family lif,e and training on 
the use of available alternatives for intervening in family disputes. 
It is interesting to observe that the pretraining given the police 
produced dramtic reduction of counter aggression on the part of the 
police in these situations. 
The importance of observational or imitative learning on aggression 
has been explored primarily by Bahdura (1969, 1 1971). He has argued that 
the operant method of learning (via reinforcement) is an extremely slow 
way to acquire new behaviors, whereas, observational learning (where 
subjects observe a model) yields rapid lea~ning rates. Then, depending 
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on whether the model's behavior is reinforced, the learning is trans-
formed into imitative behavior which becomes maintained, supported, or 
suppressed depending upon the environmental contingencies (Bandura, 
1965, 1969). In reference to aggressive behavior, Bandura et al. (1961, 
1963) has shown with children that these behaviors can be increased via 
a live or film model. Berkowitz (1968) has shown that aggression can be 
increased for adults by film models. A related study by Hartmann (1969) 
with juvenile offenders found that both the intensity and duration of 
shocks rose after exposure to a film showing models expressing 
aggression. 
Other studies have demonstrated that observation learning of 
alternatives is an equally effective means of lowering aggressive 
behavior. Chittenden (1942) had children observe a series of doll 
plays in which dolls served as models in the following sequence: (a) 
a preschool type conflict (e.g., two dolls beginning to vie for the 
possession of a wagon), (b) an aggressive solution which led to punish-
ment (e.g., during a fight for possession of the wagon, it was broken), 
and (c) a cooperative solution and positive reinforcement (e.g., the 
dolls playing with and enjoying the wagon). Relative to a control 
group, the children in the observation group showed reductions in 
aggressive interactions during test situations in nursery .school and 
one month later as well as an increase in cooperative interactions. 
Modeling and observational learning thereby proved effective 1n the 
learning of non-aggressive response styles. 
A final consideration that is often overlooked in studies of 
aggression are social mores, customs, or rules that give or take away 
sanction to aggressive behavior. In the section on "LearningandAnger," 
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the importance of cultural norms, perceptions, and judgments were shown 
to relate to emotional experience. In the same way in this society, 
such maxims as "You don't shoot a man in the back" or "All's fair in 
love and war" do effect how a person behaves. This was clearly demon-
strated in two studies (Buss, 1971; Taylor and Epstein, 1967). In both 
studies, there were male and female subjects as well as male and female 
aggressors (experimental accomplices). The results showed that males 
refused to be as aggressive to females as they were to other males even 
though observation of the male subjects showed that the effects of being 
shocked by the female aggressor was making them highly angry. It seems 
as though the males were controlling their aggressive responses by an 
early learned social dictum that '~ales do not hit (aggress against) 
females." These studies suggest that the learning of certain rules of 
behavior can be a highly effective means of reducing the probability of 
aggression even under circumstances where the person is not being 
externally rewarded for such behavior. 
In summary, aggressive behavior: 
(1) can be both increased and decreased through reinforcement 
contingencies, 
(2) can be ]:)oth increased and decreased via observational 
learning, 
(3) is effected by the tYPe of pretraining experiences, and 
(4) is, at least in some instances, determined by cultural 
rules or norms. 
The implications for the reduction of aggressive behavior would be: 
(1) training in alternative non-aggressive behavior that would 
be reinforcing, 
(2) provide models of alternative non-aggressive behavior, 
(J) provide experiences in non-aggressive behavior to 
situations that would typically elicit aggressive 
behavior, and 
(~) train people to incorporate new rules of non-aggressive 
responding. 
Rational-Emotive Analysis of Anger 
and Aggression 
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In the preceding sections, arguments were given and evidence cited 
that give strong support to the cognitive and learning influences on 
anger and aggression. Since this thesis is concerned primarily with the 
development of interventions to reduce anger and aggression that are 
derived from cognitive-learning theory, a more detailed analysis of 
Ellis' psychotherapeutic system will now be presented. 
With the publication of Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy in 
1962, Ellis presented a.system of principals that has come to be known 
as Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET). The fundamental thesis of RET is 
"that human thinking is a basic cause of emotion, and that healthy and 
unhealthy emotional reactions are significantly effected by changes in 
peoples' ~ognitions 11 (Ellis, 1972, p. 36). From this basic premise, 
Ellis has identified at least twelve irrational beliefs that give rise 
to unhealthy emotions (among which are anxiety and anger). These he 
describes as irrational emotions because they are based on false assump-
tions or illogical beliefs. He further argues that these emotions are 
not only irrational but also dysfunctional in that they prevent an 
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individual from achieving his goals and from experiencing pleasure 
(Ellis, 1972). 
Ellis (1962) distinguishes between feelings and emotions. Feelings 
are seen as "relatively pure sensory states and sensory appraisals" 
while emotions are seen to include "more wide-ranging cognitive-sensory 
processes" (p. 52). The main thrust of his approach is aimed at what he 
terms "sustained negative emotions" such as intense depression, anxiety, 
anger, and guilt which are maintained by repeated ideas and/or self-
verbalizations. Ellis (1962) argues that these emotions are "almost 
always unnecessary to human living, and that they can be eradicated if 
people learn consistently to think straight and to follow up their 
straight thinking with effective action" (p. 56). 
From Ellis' position, emotions can be changed or 11 educated11 
(Peters, 1970) by: 
(1) identifying the beliefs and cognitions underlying 
emotions, 
(2) demonstrating that changes in hypothesized beliefs lead 
to predicted changes in emotional experience, 
(J) and consciously reevaluating events with accurate rather 
than false beliefs. 
With regard to the main concern of this project, anger and aggres-
sion, Ellis (1962, 1972, 1973) argues that (a) anger is, for the most 
part, an inappropriate emotion and aggression an inappropriate behavior, 
and (b) that it "would be better" if anger and aggression were reduced 
or eliminated, and (c) it can be done. 
Anger is an inappropriate emotion because it comes largely from 
the following beliefs and cognitions: 
11 1 have to have what I want now." 
11 1 can't stand it" (events, people, feelings). 
"It shouldn't be this way." 
"It's because of them, they are to blame," 
While it often happens that these ideas occur in a chain, each of 
these cognitions can be evaluated with respect to what makes it irra-
tional. They will first be analyzed as individual statements and then 
shown how they,could link together to form a chain of ideas. 
The first statement, "I have to have what I want now" contains 
several untenable propositions: (a) a demand that the world operate 
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to suit that particular person, (b) an implied necessity that the demand 
be granted, and (c) an unrealistic demand that the wish or desire be 
granted at that moment. Since there are very few needs that an indi-
vidual requires to be able to survive (air, food, water), this belief 
is then empirically unverifiable and, therefore, irrational. 
"I can't stand it" whether referring to events, people, or feelings 
is an unrealistic statement because even though events are unpleasant, 
painful, or difficult people are able to live through them and rarely 
succomb to them. This, then, becomes an exaggeration of an existing 
event which makes it both untrue and unverifiable. 
"It shouldn't be this way 11 is another way of saying things should 
not be the way they are. This type of belief stems from a refusal to 
accept the fact of being frustrated and again demands that the world 
operate to satisfy the individual's desires. Even though many good 
reasons could be advanced for why it would be better if things were 
different, there are no reasons that can be given for why things should 
not be as they are. Therefore, this statement is illogical. 
The last statementj 11 It 1 s because of them, they are to blame" is 
irrational for several reasons: 
(1) It assumes that every person has the freedom to act 
"rightly" or "wrongly" in relation to an absolute standard 
of truth and justice ordained by 11 God 11 or the "natural 
law" and if anyone uses his "free will" to behave wrongly 
he is a wicked person. These ideas have no scientific 
foundation because terms such as "absolute truth," "God, 11 
!!free will, 11 and "natural law" are definitional and can 
neither be proven or disproven empirically. 
(2) When individuals perform acts that others consider "wrong" 
they usually do so because they are either stupid, ignorant, 
or too emotionally disturbed to refrain from doing so. 
Although they are responsible for what they did, it is 
unreasonable to blame them for being the way they are. 
(J) Because of man's biological makeup and social training, 
it is unrealistic to expect him to act perfectly, but 
realistic to expect that he will make errors and make 
mistakes. 
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The statements identified above that give rise to anger most fre-
quently occur when an individual experiences frustration. Other writers 
(Berkowitz,· 1962, 1968; Buss, 1961; and Dollard et al., 1939) have also 
emphasized the correlation between frustration and anger. Landau (1972) 
has diagrammed an interpretation of Ellis' theory of anger in which 
frustration is implicated. (See Figure 1.) 
From the diagram, the first point in the chain is a set of beliefs 
or expectancies. When the expectancy is disconfirmed, the cognition 
becomes part of the experience of frustration. These, in turn, lead to 
evaluations of the experience of frustration such as 11 1 can't stand it," 
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"it shouldn't be this way." These then can, theoretically, feedback and 
intensify the experience of frustration and increase the probability of 
blaming cognitions. 
The importance of cognitive "self stimulation" in intensifying 
negative reactions has also been noted by Berkowitz (1962): 
A person's hostile tendencies may also remain in full force 
if there is a consistent source of stimulation to aggression 
operating within him •••• People may stimulate themselves 
to continued resentment against a frustrator, even after 
aggressing against him, if they continually remind themselves 
of the provocations they have received (p. 211). 
And later on, 
••• behavior of young children also illustrates the rapid 
dissipation of anger. Preschoolers are easily aroused, but 
their emotional excitement can vanish just as quickly. The 
children may not stimulate themselves to continued emotion-
ality by thinking of the instigating situation. Once dis-
tracted their mood changes rapidly. Adults might also 
exhibit such shifts in mood if the instigating events did 
not remain symbolically in their thoughts (p. 222). 
Returning then to Landau's diagram of Ellis' theory, there are at 
least three points of intervention to reduce anger. 
(1) "I have to have what I want now." This belief could be 
changed from a demand to a desire. For example, "l would 
like to have what I want now." Desires can be seen as 
goals to achieve with a focus on "how to go about attaining 
what I want in the future." 
(2) Once a person is thwarted and experiences frustration, 
an intervention at the "I can't stand it" point could pre-
vent the escalation of the experience of frustration. For 
example, the individual could change his evaluation to "I 
don't like not getting what I want but I can stand it" or 
"things are the way they are even if I don 1 t like them." 
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A person can also be trained to use his experience of 
frustration as a signal that his goal has not been reached 
and to then consider alternative ways to reach his goal. 
(3) Table I shows some of the deterministic, practical, and 
philosophical arguments used by Ellis to challenge.the 
blaming cognitions. 
Hypothetically, these verbal statements should (a) interfer with 
statements which intensify negative feelings, (b) reduce the intensity 
of the frustration experience, (c) reduce the probability of blaming and 
anger, and (d) predispose the ind!vidual toward problem solving or 
assertive behavior rather than aggressive behavior. 
The above analysis demonstrates both why Ellis considers the 
emotion anger an irrational emotion and various points of intervention 
to either reduce or eliminate anger. In addition, he points out the 
irrational aspects of the behavior aggression. He distinguishes between 
assertiveness and aggression in the following way: 
(1) Assertiveness occurs when an individual actively seeks 
to get what he wants. 
(2) Aggression occurs when the individual demands or dictates 
that he absolutely must get what he wants and/or blames 
others for his frustrations (Ellis, 1972). 
Implied in this differentiation is that assertiveness is a rational 
behavior, whereas aggression would be viewed as irrational. Assertive-
ness comes from an individual's desires, while aggressiveness arises 
from an individual's demands. Assertiveness is related to goal-directed 
behavior and problem-solving behavior, therefore, the individual when 
seeking satisfaction can entertain alternatives should he be thwarted. 
Aggression, on the other hand, involves behaviors that are aimed at 
putting down or blaming another person when frustrated, expressions of 
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TABLE I 
BLAMING-ANGER ARGUMENTS FROM ELLIS (1962, 1961) 
I. Deterministic Arguments 
A. Blaming others is based on the theological doctrine of free 
will. People become conditioned early to act in certain ways 
and it is most difficult to change. To blame an individual is 
to unfairly attribute to him a perfect freedom to choose his 
behavior. 
II. Practical Arguments - negative consequences 
A. Even when wrong conduct can be agreed upon it is senseless to 
blame because the person will almost invariably become pre-
occupied with punishing himself or refuse to admit he is wrong 
rather than on how to change the incorrect behavior. 
B. One who blames himself for his errors will tend to be afraid 
of making mistakes and will forego experimentation and risk 
taking. 
C. Blaming oneself or others leads to unpleasant feelings and 
increases the possibility of ulcers and diverts from changing 
the behavior. 
D. If you blame others, this will lead to blaming oneself for 
errors. 
III. Philosophical Arguments 
A. Blame assumes that good or bad behavior is easy to define. To 
exorcise humans for their difficulties in defining and accept-
ing good behavior is unrealistic and unjust. 
B. Blaming a person means to confuse his wrong acts with his 
sinful being. No matter how many evil ,acts an individual per-
forms, he cannot be intrinsically evil, because he could 
change his behavior and commit no additional wrong deeds. To 
blame a person for wrong acts is to say that because he acted 
wrongly in the past, he must always do so. 
C. To blame inevitably means to become angry or hostile to a 
person-to feel he should not do what he did. Anger is a 
reflection of one's own grandiosity. One is saying: (a) I do 
not like Joe's behavior, (b) he should n~t have done this. The 
second sentence is a non-sequitur; because there is no reason 
why Joe should not have acted as he did, merely because I 
didn't like it. One is being God-like or unrealistic to 
believe that his preference regarding Joe's behavior should 
make Joe act differently than he did. 
hostility, or angry demands that need be met. 
Aggressive behavior is irrational and self defeating according to 
Ellis (1962) for the following reasons: 
(1) Expressing hostility increases rather than decreases 
negative feelings. 
(2) Expressing hostility toward others often elicits 
recrimination or penalization from others. 
(3) Blaming or putting down an individual for his behavior 
rarely changes it. 
(4) Expressing overt hostility absorbs so much time and 
energy that it diverts one from achieving his goals. 
(5) The expression of hostility is disruptive and can lead 
to psychosomatic reactions and preoccupation with one's 
own negative feelings rather than more enjoyable 
pursuits. 
For Ellis, much of aggressive behavior arises out of angry emotions 
and, therefore, major points of intervention to reduce aggressive behav-
ior would be the same as reducing angry emotions as outlined above. In 
addition, Ellis as well as other RET therapists emphasize the importance 
of behavioral retraining as well as cognitive restructuring (Ellis, 
1971). This is seen most clearly in the emphasis given in RET to home-
work assignments (Maultsby, 1970; Ellis, 1962). More specifically, the 
reduction of aggressive behavior would be accomplished by: 
(1) Eliminating or replacing anger arousing cognitions and 
beliefs. 
(2) Training an individual to assertively seek his desires 
rather than aggressively demanding them. 
(3) Training an individual to express his displeasure rather 
than hostility or blame. 
(4) Training an individual to express his dislike of acts and 
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behaviors of others rather than disapproval or hostility 
toward the whole person, 
(5) Having the individual practice assertive behavior in 
instances where he is usually·aggressive. 
Empirical·Review of RET 
An equally important consideration in Ellis' analysis of anger and 
aggression is not only that it would be better if both were reduced but 
that it~ be done. There appears to be no direct experimental con-
firmation of the effect of cognitive approaches to the reduction of 
anger and aggressive behavior. However, clinical and theoretical anal-
ysis of Murder and Assassination (Ellis and Gullo, 1972) as well as 
careful experimental tests of Rational-Emotive Therapy with respect to 
anxiety support the hypothesis that Ellis' analyses and procedures are 
important. Other work has shown that procedures that are effective with 
anxiety are also effective with anger (Rimm et al., 1971; Hokanson, 
1962, 1968; Bandura, 1961). With regard to the effectiveness of Ellis' 
methods, studies will be described that have used RET in their research 
designs. 
Meichenbaum et al. (1971) observed: 
In two large reviews of the psychotherapy literature, Eysenck 
••• concluded that only three studies offered even meager 
evidence for the existence of psychotherapy effectiveness. 
Two of these three stµdies.used the "semantic" psychotherapies 
of Phillips ••• andEllis •• •i the third approach to yield 
evidence of effectiveness was the desensitization therapy of 
Wolpe. Much recent work has seemed to confirm the efficacy 
of desensitization treatment ••• yet little research has 
been conducted to discover what might determine the effective-
ness of semantic psychotherapies (p. 410). 
The major comparisons in Meichenbaum's experiment were among four 
treatment groups for speech anxiety: (a) a desensitization condition 
(which previous research had shown to be effective), (b) an Ellis 
Rational-Emotive procedure in which it was emphasized that: 
••• speech anxiety is the result of self verbalizations and 
internalized sentences.which are emitted while thinking about 
the speech situatiofr ••• (the goal of therapy) was to become 
aware of ••• the self verba-lizations and self instructions • 
• • and ••• to produce incompatible self instructions and 
incompatible behavior •••• no behavioral rehearsal or 
assertive training ••• was conducted, 
(c) a combined desensitization and Rational-Emotive procedure, and (d) 
a speech discussion placebo group. Each group met for eight weekly 
one-hour sessions. 
The results were as follows: (a) on a variety of measures (sub-
J6 
jective fear, judged fear, and behavioral anxiety) both the desens!tiza-
tion and the Rational-Emotive groups showed marked improvements, (b) 
the combined desensitization and Rational-Emotive group was less sue-
cessful than either group alone (Meichenbaum notes that since this group 
received only the last four sessions of insight training "sufficient 
time was not left to explore incompatible self instructions and behav-
iors"), and (c) the relationships were maintained among the groups after 
a three-month follow~up. The authors note "that modification of both 
the 'autonomic arousal' as well as the accompanying cognitive determi-
nents. should provide maximum change." In agreement with the 
writers, it would seem that "variations of the present combination of 
desensitization·and self-instructional insight therapy ••• may still 
prove to be the most effective treatment for reducing anxiety." 
Another important finding was reported in a post-hoc analysis. 
It was observed that two types of subjects within each treatment group 
could be differentiated; one type appeared shy in many interpersonal 
situations while the other appeared anxious, specifically in the speech 
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situation. A treatment by subject interaction was found which indicated 
that the generalized anxiety subject was significantly improved over the 
specific fear subject in the Rational-Emotive treatment and combined 
Rational desensitization group, whereas the specific fear subject was 
most improved with desensitization treatment. 
In a similar study (Meichenbau~, 1972) with test anxious subjects, 
the cognitive modification group (which combined awareness of anxiety 
producing thoughts, coping imagery, and self instruction to attend to 
the task) was more effective than the desensitization group at post-
treatment and one-month follow-up. It was further found that the cog-
nitive modification group did not differ from a control group of low 
test anxious subjects. 
Other work by Meichenbaum and his associates have consistently 
demonstrated the importance of cognitive modification to behavior 
change (Meichenbaum and Goodman, 1971; Steffy and Meichenbaum, 1970; 
Wine, 1971; Meichenbaum, 1971). 
Di Loreto (1968) in an important doctoral dissertation specifically 
investigated interpersonal anxiety reduction as a function of client 
type (introvert-extrovert) and type of therapy (Rational-Emotive 
Therapy, RT; Client Centered, CC; and Systematic Desensitization, SD). 
Each group (5-6) met for nine weeks in one to one and orie-half hour 
sessions. The major results were as follows: (a) with respect to in-
troverts RT was more effective than CC and equally as effective as SD 
on most self report and behavioral measures. On the "daily logs" of 
outside interpersonal contact, RT was twice as effective in increasing 
outside contact than CC and thirty percent more effective than SD, (b) 
RT was less effective with extroverts. This finding is in agreement 
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with Meichenbaum's results that RET was most effective with subjects 
who evidenced generalized anxiety. This seemed in part due to the dif-
ferences in the two RT counselors with extroverts. One was able to 
produce significant reduction in anxiety relative to the controls and 
the other was no more effective than simple attention or no treatment 
at all. 
Burkhead (1970), also in a doctoral dissertation, investigated the 
effectiveness of RET on anxiety. Anxiety was induced in subjects by the 
expectancy of an electric shock. To determine the effectiveness of 
personal contact, one group received RET by a tape recording and another 
group received RET through personal contact with a therapist. A third 
group listened to a tape designed to reinforce irrational beliefs and 
the control group read magazines during the treatment. Using GSR and 
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List both groups receiving RET showed a 
significant reduction in anxiety. An increase in anxiety was found in 
the group reinforced for irrational beliefs. The fact that subjects 
receiving RET by tape showed as much anxiety reduction as those who 
received RET with a therapist suggests two things: (a) that Ellis' 
analysis of anxiety is useful and (b) it is easy to understand and apply 
his concepts. 
In support of these hypotheses, Maultsby (1971) conducted a study 
with outpatients in which the primary treatment was systematic written 
homework based on the theory of RET. Patients identified irrational 
beliefs, challenged them, and replaced them with rational beliefs. 
Analysis of variance revealed that ratings of improvement (by indepen-
dent judges) varied with patients' use of the homework exercise. 
Further support for the effectiveness of RET in reducing anxiety 
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comes from a study by Karst and Trexler (1970). They compared two cog-
nitive therapies (Kelly's fixed role and Ellis' Rational-Emotive 
Therapy) with no treatment for speech anxious subjects. Even with brief 
treatment (three sessions spaced several days apart):both therapy treat-
ments were superior to no treatment on both self report and behavioral 
measures. At posttest several measures showed a slight superiority of 
fixed role therapy over RET but at six month follow-up these differences 
disappeared. 
In his new book Humanistic Psychotherapy (1973), Ellis also cites 
the following studies demonstrating the effectiveness of RET techniques 
(Maultsby, 1970; Baker, 1966; Sharma, 1970; Zingle, 1965; Shapiro et 
al., 1959, 1962). In addition, several studies have been undertaken to 
evaluate Ellis' basic thesis of the relationship between irrational 
thinking and emotional disturbance (Rimm, 1969; Davies, 1970, 1971; 
Mac Donald and Games, 1972; Jones, 1968; Taft, 1965). 
Reviewing the results of this section, several points have been 
demonstrated: 
(1) Cognitive-linguistic procedures are effective in reducing 
subjective as well as behavioral indices of anxiety. 
(2) Cognitive-linguistic procedures are especially effective 
with generalized anxiety. 
(3) Cognitive-linguistic procedures are effective even without 
the intervention of a therapist. 
(4) Irrational beliefs are related to emotional responding. 
Empirical Review of Assertive Training 
In evaluating Ellis' approach to the reduction of anger and 
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aggression, it is important to consider behavioral retraining as well as 
cognitive education. In this regard, Ellis (1973) states that RET: 
••• not only shows the client what his maladjustment-
creating philosophies are, but ••• induces him to attack, 
challenge, and work against these philosophies and to retrain 
himself to think and behave more efficiently (italics added) 
(p. 37), 
and in another article (1971), 
••• it (RET) not only employs cognitive and evocative-
expressive methods but it also includes some of the main 
elements of behavior therapy, especially our desensitizing 
homework assignments ••• (p. 13), 
and later on, 
All therapy ••• includes cognitive, emotive, and behavioral 
methods; and RET consciously and specifically does so (p. 13). 
As was noted above, Ellis distinguishes between assertiveness, in 
which the individual actively seeks to get what he wants and aggressive-
ness, in which the individual angrily demands that he be satisfied or 
blames others for his frustrations. This definition of assertiveness is 
similar to the one given by Fensterhein: "an open and direct, honest, 
and appropriate expression of what a person feels and thinks" 
(Fensterhein, 1972, p. 21). Alberti and Emmons (1970) also define 
assertiveness as "Behavior which enables a person to act in his own best 
interests, to stand up for himself without undue anxiety, and to exer-
cise his rights without denying the rights of others" (p. 7). 
Assertive training as conceptualized by recent theorists (Kelly, 
1955; Wolpe, 1958; Lazarus, 1965; Salter, 1961) involves direct training 
for individuals who have difficulties in interpersonal situations 
through the use of such techniques as behavioral rehearsal, modeling, 
and coaching. These techniques may involve any of the following pro-
cedures: hierarchical presentation of stimulus situations, operant 
shaping by the therapist, constructive criticism, role playing, role 
reversal, repeated playbacks of tape recorded responses, homework 
assignments, postural and vocal analysis, therapist lecturing, relaxa-
tion, or exaggerated-role therapy (Wolpe and Lazarus, 1966). 
While there has been an increased interest in assertive training 
techniques as evidenced by the large number of papers presented at the 
1973 meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy, 
this author has been unable to locate any studies using assertive train-
ing to reduce aggressive behavior. The studies that have been reported 
have been, for the most part, designed to train anxious and inhibited 
persons to be able to express themselves in anxiety-producing situ~~ 
tions. However, it should be noted that in nearly all of the studies 
reviewed some aspects of the training procedure were to instruct indi-
viduals on how to be assertive in situations where they were confronted 
with an aggressive individual. 
One hypothesis that could be plausible is that the inhibited indi-
viduals in at least some of the cases were highly angry and experienced 
anxiety because of fear of expressing their anger. Support for this 
hypothesis comes from a recent study by Berkowitz (1969) in which sub-
jects who were made to think they were either low or high in anger were 
less.aggressive (shock administered) than those who thought they were 
moderate in anger. There was also evidence that the high anger subjects 
had inhibited strong aggressive responses because the knowledge that 
they were angry made them highly anxious. Since the studies which 
report assertive training did not measure for anger levels, this will 
have to remain as only an interesting hypothesis. A review of the 
studies using assertive training procedures will be presented to assess 
the effectiveness of this approach in producing behavioral change. 
Lazarus (1966) claims to have reported the first objective study of 
behavioral rehearsal in which he compared it to direct advice and non-
directive therapies in training patients to be more assertive. He found 
behavioral rehearsal effective with 86% of his patients with the other 
two falling clearly behind (44% and 32%, respectively). 
This study is only suggestive of the value of assertive training 
and would hardly be convincing because Lazarus is no doubt more com-
mitted to behavioral rehearsal as a technique than the other methods and 
because his procedures were not very explicit or objectively defined. 
These objections have been overcome in two related studies by 
McFall and his associates (McFall and Marston, 1970; McFall and 
Lillesand, 1971). In the first study, a semiautomated and standardized 
procedure was developed paralleling behavioral rehearsal procedures. 
Subjects responded to tape recorded situations and either heard a tape 
replay of his response (Experimental Group I) or was told to think about 
his response (Experimental Group II) after which he gave a verbal eval-
uation of how he did based on an outline of acceptable performance 
variables. Each subject received four one-hour training experiences 
with increasingly difficult situations that they were required to re~ 
spond to. On behavioral, self report, and physiological measures, sub-
jects receiving behavioral rehearsal improved more than placebo-therapy 
or untreated controls. The response feedback (Experimental Group I) 
tended to be more ef.fecti ve than no feedback (Experimental Group II). 
In the second experiment, modeling and coaching were added to the 
basic procedure. After the subject responded to the taped situation, he 
heard taped responses of an assertive response (modeling) and then heard 
a narrator describe what makes a good assertive response (coaching). 
Subjects received two twenty-minute training sessions. With only forty 
minutes of training, the behavioral rehearsal-modeling-coaching group 
improved significantly:more than the controls on both self report and 
behavioral measures. 
An interesting side light to these studies is that the training 
procedures were effective with much fewer sessions involved (four and 
two, respectively) than the often used design which is one hour per week 
for eight weeks (e.g., Meichenbaum, 1971; Paul, 1965). 
Behavioral rehearsal was investigated as to its effectiveness in a 
small group counseling setting with unassertive college students 
(Hedquist and Weinhold, 1970). This procedure was compared with another 
behaviorally oriented procedure (Mainard's Social Learning Approach) and 
an untreated control. The groups met for six sessions and kept diaries 
of their outside assertive responses. The first three weeks showed 
highly significant differences. The two experimental groups did not 
differ from each other. This study demonstrates that behavioral re-
hearsal training can be adapted to a small group (N= 10) and that sub-
jects charting of their own assertive behavior outside the group was a 
reliable procedure (reliability was partially checked by comparing sub-
jects• reports to class diaries that were required for a course all sub-
jects were enrolled in). 
Bandura (1971) reports a doctoral study by Friedman (1968) in which 
he investigated the effects of verbal modeling, behavioral modeling, and 
behavioral rehearsal with non-assertive college students. 
One group received verbal modeling (subjects read a script of 
assertive responses) and behavioral rehearsal (practiced assertive 
responses). A second group received behavioral modeling (model demon-
strated assertive responses) and behavioral rehearsal. Another group 
generated their own examples of assertiveness and then rehearsed. 
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Other groups received either behavioral modeling alone, verbal modeling 
alone, or served as controls. On self report and behavioral measures, 
the behavioral modeling plus rehearsal group increased their assertive-
ness threefold. The other treatment groups doubled their assertive 
responding and were significantly more assertive than the control group 
(unchanged) but did not differ from each other. It can be seen from 
this study that modeling and rehearsal clearly are effective techniques 
in increasing assertive responding and in combination (at least in the 
use of behavioral modeling and rehearsal) are impressively effective. 
Eisler (1973) looked at the effect of giving assertive training to 
one partner in a marital dyad. Three couples were videotaped discussing 
their marital conflicts before and after the husband received assertive 
training. Training consisted of rehearsal of specific behaviors (e.g., 
response latency, duration of speech, loudness of voice, and duration of 
looking) which previous work (Eisler, 1973) had shown to be related to 
judgments of overall assertiveness. Rehearsal was carried out with a 
female research assistant who attempted to role play the subject's wife. 
The subject was instructed to increase the specific behaviors that were 
observed to be deficient from the first videotaped interaction. Results 
from the post treatment interaction (with wives) tape revealed that all 
three subjects• assertive behavior was increased while the wives' asser-
tive behavior remained unchanged. However, there were some qualitative 
changes on the wives' part (more positive responses, less critical 
responding, and more smiling). 
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While this is essentially a pilot study, it further corroborates 
the effectiveness of even brief assertive training (45 minutes). This 
study further suggests that training one partner of a dyad can be 
effective in an intimate relationship and can be transferred and main-
tained under difficult circumstances (discussion of marital conflicts). 
From the studies reviewed on assertive training, several techniques 
have been demonstrated to effect increased assertive responding. Most 
prominent has been behavioral rehearsal. Other techniques include feed-
back, coaching, behavioral modeling, verbal modeling. From these 
studies, the following points can be drawn: 
(1) Assertive behavior can be trained. 
(2) Practicing assertive responses seems to be the most 
effective variable. 
(J) A variety of methods can be used to assure that a person 
understands what is meant by an assertive response. 
(4) Increased assertive responding can occur with relatively 
brief and few training sessions. 
(5) Assertive training can be effectively learned in a small 
group. 
CHAPTER III 
RATIONALE FOR STUDY 
On the basis of the review of the literature, a cognitive-
behavioral approach to the reduction of anger and aggression based on 
Ellis' cognitive-linguistic analysis and the behavior therapy approach 
to assertive training seems important both theoretically and clinically. 
If, as the evidence cited suggests, anger and aggressive behavior 
are 'to a large extent under cognitive control and both the cognitions 
and the behaviors are learned, then an optimism toward the reduction of 
aggression and violence is warranted. This position is in direct con-
trast to the drive notion of aggression postulated by Freud and the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis articulated by the Yale group 
(Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1939) in which aggression is 
viewed as necessary to relieve tension. The pessimism engendered by 
this view has been demonstrated (Berkowitz, 1962; Dennenberg and Zarrow, 
1970). 
The cognitive-learning approach views aggression as neither a drive 
nor a necessity, posing instead the alternative position that both anger 
and aggression are learned and, therefore, can be unlearned. It would 
seem, therefore, that clinical positions based in their theoretical 
position would offer the most to efforts aimed at eliminating or reduc-
ing anger and aggressive behavior. 
Ellis' Rational-Emotive Therapy system is predicated on the 
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cognitive-learning view of emotion and behavior (Ellis, 1962). His 
system, thereby, offers a direct translation of theory into clinical 
practice. Ellis' system has the further advantage of having a fully 
developed philosophical system, a set of statements regarding beliefs 
and cognitions hypothesized to underlie emotional experience, and 
rational-empirical procedures which appear useful in producing change. 
In relation to anger, he specifies several philosophical beliefs (cog-
nitions) which give rise to anger, presents logical arguments as to why 
these are irrational, gives examples of rational beliefs, and describes 
the resultant emotions. He further argues th~t these beliefs have been 
learned and can, therefore, be unlearned. He makes clear how the un-
learning and new learning of beliefs would take place. The process of 
reducing anger would, then, involve the identification of the anger-
producing cognitions (irrational beliefs) and substituting alternative 
cognitions (rational beliefs) that are non-anger producing. Since 
Ellis' system is clearly rooted in cognitive-learning theory and his 
cognitive beliefs and rationales for reducing anger are clearly spelled 
out, the decision was made to incorporate his procedures into a training 
program designed to reduce anger and aggression. 
For Ellis, aggressive behavior is also a function of learning and 
cognitive evaluation. The individual believes that he must have what he 
wants now and learns to be demanding, hostile, or vengeful as a means of 
trying to insure that his demands are met. Ellis articulates the irra-
tionality of aggressive behavior and vie~s assertive behavior as the 
most appropriate alternative. His strategy for the reduction of aggres-
sive behavior would be twofold. The first part would consist of con-
vincing a person of the irrationality and self-defeating aspects of 
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aggressive behavior. The second would be trying to instruct the person 
to act assertively in situations that he would typically act aggres-
sively. The first'part of his strategy is clearly discernible from his 
writings but the second part is vague and unclear. 
Sin·ce his description of assertive behavior is compatible with that 
presented by the behavior therapists, this literature was reviewed and 
found to give clearer training procedures and highly convincing results. 
For this study it was, therefore, decided to include both the arguments 
against aggressive behavior presented by Ellis and some of the assertive 
training techniques demonstrated to be effective in the behavioral 
literature. 
This study, then, was an attempt to look at the effectiveness of 
a training program based on Ellis' Rational-Emotive system of therapy 
and certain behavioral techniques and to assess their effectiveness on 
the reduction of anger and aggressive behavior. The cognitive-.· 
linguistic arguments and techniques developed by Ellis to demonstrate 
the irrationality of both anger and aggressive behavior were used as 
well as behavioral rehearsal, modeling, and coaching techniques for 
increasing assertive behavior. 
To test the effectiveness of the training program four groups of 
female subjects were selected who evidenced above average levels of 
anger and aggression. There were two experimental groups which received 
the cognitive-behavioral training procedures. Two groups were run to 
determine whether the eff.ects would replicate. In addition, there were 
two control groups. One group met and discussed problems relative to 
anger and aggression with men but received no formal training. Another 
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group did not meet and served as a control for talcing tests and filling 
out daily logs. 
The cognitive-behavioral training procedures consisted of identify-
ing irrational statements leading to anger, replacing these with 
rational statements, identifying situations where aggressive behavior 
occurred and practicing assertive responses to these situations. In 
addition, the experimental groups kept daily logs of their anger re-
sponses and behavioral responses in interactions with men. 
The design for the study was a 2 x 4 factorial design. A 2 x 4 
analysis of variance with repeated measures was used to assess the re-
sults of this study. A .05 confidence level was set to determine 
acceptance of the hypotheses. 
Specifically, the hypotheses being tested were: 
(1) The training groups receiving cognitive-behavioral training 
would significantly reduce their aggressiveness relative to 
the control groups (discussion control, minimum contact). 
(2) The training groups receiving cognitive-behavioral training 
would significantly increase their assertive behavior rela-
tive to the control groups (discussion control, minimum 
contact). 
(J) The training groups receiving cognitive-behavioral training 
would reduce their anger relative to the control groups 




The subjects for this study were 30 female freshman and sophomore 
students enrolled in introductory psychology courses for undergraduate 
credit at the University of Maryland. All subjects who participated in 
the study were volunteers who had high self-reported feelings of anger 
or aggressiveness and indicated a desire for inclusions in the groups. 
Subjects were given maximum extra credit for participating in the 
experiment. ~'s were randomly assigned to two experimental groups and 
two control groups. The randomization was limited to some degree by the 
subject's availability for the time that the groups met. 
Selection Process 
The following announcement was posted on the board designated for 
psychological experiments: 
As part of a research project, groups are being formed for 
women who would like help in dealing with their feelings of 
anger or hostility in their relationships to men. To see if 
you are interested or qualify, an orientation meeting is 
scheduled to explain the project and to administer a battery 
of tests. 
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At the orientation meeting, the project was explained in the 
following way: 
Many women are finding· that they are experiencing many more 
negative and hostile feelings as they become increasingly 
aware of their secondary position as women. Women are reporting 
that this is especially affecting their interactions and rela-
tionships with men. This project was conceiv~d to look at 
various ways which women could become more effective in dealing 
with their feelings and their relationships to men. 
In order to do this, we will be meeting in small groups 
two hours a week for four weeks. In order to determine whe-
ther the groups we are forming would be of help to you, a 
small assessment battery will now be given and approximately 
an hour of individual testing will be scheduled next week. 
At the end of the four group meetings, there will be another 
assessment which will take about one to two hours. In addi-
tion, part of the program will involve keeping daily records 
of your behavior which will probably take about 15 minutes. 
I am an experienced psychotherapist and will be leading 
the groups, however, these are not therapy groups, but groups 
in which we will try to understand the nature of our feelings 
and look at alternative ways of relating and responding to men. 
After this explanation was given, there was an opportunity for 
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those who were either not interested or did not have the time to leave· 
before the assessment battery was given. Of those who attended the 
orientation sessions, approximately 10 chose not to participate. 
The Buss-Durkee Inventory, The Attitudes Toward Women Scale, the 
Irrational Belief Inventory, and the Scrambled Sentences were admin-
istered. After these were completed, each~ was given a packet of 
15 .3 x 5 cards with the following instructions read aloud: 
Think of experiences or situations with men that have 
occurred in the past six months in which you have had feelings 
ranging from mildly annoyed to extremely angry. On the cards 
briefly describe these situations. Try to think of at least 
ten situations and put one situation on each card. 
After this was done, they were instructed: 
Look at your cards again and see if you can rank order 
them from least to most angry, with least angry being the 
first card. 
When this was completed, they received the following instructions: 
Now, I want you to imagine a scale from 1-100 like this 
(a ruler like scale with points marked off was shown) marked 
off in 10 point intervals, much like a thermometer scale. 
Now, think of a situation with a man where you felt very 
mild displeasure. Describe that situation briefly on one 
of your blank cards. Assign that card a number 1. 
After this was done, the instructions continued: 
Now, imagine a situation with a man in which you would 
fe~l your most intense anger or rage. Briefly write down 
tfiat situation. Assign that a number 100. (pause) Note 
that 50 is the midpoint intensity. Look over your cards and 
assign numbers to them. If you do not have an item at one of 
the intensities, use one of your blank cards to describe 
either a situation that has occurred or one in which you could 
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imagine a feeling at that intensity. So that when you finish 
you will have at least one situation at each intensity. 
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In this way, the anger hierarchies were developed and E_'s received 
training in discriminating various intensities of subjective anger. 
This procedure is patterned after the hierarchies Wolpe (1958) described 
in discriminating levels of anxiety. Rimm et al. (1971) also used a 
hierarchy of anger producing situations in a study of systematic desen-
sitization of anger responses. 
Once the hierarchies were completed, the instructions were given 
for the Daily Logs (Index of Anger and Aggressive Behavior). 
In order to get further practice in rating your feelings 
in situations with men, each of you will be asked to keep a 
daily log of your interactions with men in which you feel some 
degree of anger from mild displeasure to extreme anger. You 
also will indicate how you responded to that situation. That 
is, whether you were passive - said very little or did not say 
what you thought or felt; assertive - said what you thought 
or felt or stated what you wanted; aggressive - said what you 
thought or felt but in a hostile manner or made put down 
statements. 
Each person was given a packet of Daily Logs and the instructions 
continued: 
You have seven sheets, use one sheet for each day for 
the next week, starting tomorrow. You will bring these 
sheets with you to your first group meeting. It is very 
important that these sheets be filled in each day and that 
you record each situation in which you feel some degree of 
anger. This will both give you practice in recording your 
feelings and your reactions and also something to compare 
your feelings now with what your feelings will be later. 
The orientation was given several times and the groups varied in 
size from 6 to 15. The purpose of the orientation meeting was twofold, 
(a) one was to inform the potential ~'s of what was involved in the 
study and how much time would be required if they decided to partici-
pate and (b) to administer the pre treatment battery to determine which 
women met the criterion for participation. 
S 1 s were selected for inclusion based (a) on their desire for 
inclusion and willingness to come to all group meetings and (b) a score 
above 25 on the Buss-Durkee Inventory. This combined score on the Buss-
Durkee indicated they were above the mean on anger and hostility. This 
was determined by averaging the norms for three samples of college 
females (Buss, 1961). On the basis of these criteria, 10 women chose 
not to participate because of scheduling difficulties and three were 
eliminated because they did not score high enough on the Buss-Durkee 
Inventory. 
All women who came to the orientation were contacted by telephone 
to (a) inform S 1 s of the time of their individual testing; (b) inform 
S's of the time and place of their group meeting; (c) for those that did 
not meet the criterion, they were told that a group would not be meeting 
at the times they indicated they were available; and (ct) the minimum 
contact control group was told it was not necessary that they should 
meet in a group but were asked to complete the Daily Logs each week and 
mail them to E. 
55 
Research Procedure 
After the orientation session in which part of the pre assessment 
battery was administered, each! was contacted and scheduled for indi-
vidual testing. During this time .§.'splayed the Man-Woman game with one 
of two confederates. All pre testing was concluded before spring 
semester break. Groups began immediately after spring break, one week 
later. All S•s met in small groups (6-8) with the exception of the 
minimum contact group which did not meet at all. 
Each group met at the same time each week for four weeks. Econ-
ducted all of the groups. At the end of the four-week training period, 
S 1 s met in their respective groups (except the minimum contact group 
which was tested individually because of scheduling difficulties). At 
this meeting, the groups were administered the Buss-Durkee, List B of 
the Scrambled Sentences, the Irrational Belief Inventory, and were 
scheduled to again play the Man-Woman game. Each E_ played the game with 
a different confederate than at pre testing. A brief questionnaire was 
given at the conclusion of the game to evaluate the effects of partici-
pating in the project (see Appendix). 
Daily Logs were collected from all S•s each week (by mail from the 
minimum contact control group) and a new one given. 
Research Instruments 
The main battery of scales administered were designed to assess 
(a) self-reported levels of anger and aggression (Buss-Durkee Inventory, 
Buss and Durkee, 1957), (b) baseline anger and aggressive responding 
(Scrambled Sentenpe Technique, Watson, Pritzker and Madison, 1955; Index 
of Anger and Aggressive Behavior, author), (c) general level of 
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irrationality (Irrational Belief Scale, Fox and Davies, 1971), and (d) 
situational assessment of anger, aggressive, and assertive behaviors 
(Man-Woman interaction game, Psychology Today, 1971 modified by author). 
In addition, the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (Spence and Helmreich, 
1972) was administered to assess the degree of identification of the 
female S 1 s with current feminist values. 
The Buss-Durkee Inventory (Buss and Durkee, 1957) has several 
advantages for research purposes. It provides seven subscales of 
hostility-aggression (assault, indirect, irritability, negativism, 
resentment, suspicion, verbal) and thereby allows for an analysis of 
patterning scores. The items are written to minimize social desir-
ability. In a factor analytic study of the subscales, the results indi-
cate that the various scales are tapping at least partially independent 
classes of behavior (Buss and Durkee, 1957). There is data to suggest 
moderate stability for most of the scales. Buss (1961) reports several 
sets of norms on college and psychiatric populations. The test also 
yields two factors that are consistent with the division between aggres-
sion and hostility. This scale was administered at both pre and post 
testing (Appendix B). 
The Scrambled Sentence Technique (Watson~ Pritzker and Madison, 
1955) involves a neutral and hostile solution in unscrambling four 
words. Thus, 11 take arm his break" can be unscrambled to form ntake his 
arm" or "break his arm. 11 There are two equivalent lists of thirty items 
which can be used for pre and post testing (Appendix B). In this study, 
List A was administered at pre testing and List Bat post testing. Buss 
et al. (Buss, Fischer, and Simmons, 1962) state that scores on this test 
represent a base level of aggressive or hostile responding and also 
found it to significantly correlate with the Buss-Durkee Inventory, 
especially for females. 
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For group administration, the items were placed on slides with 
three second exposure time and five second intervals (pilot work had 
suggested these as appropriate intervals). S 1 s were instructed to drop 
one word from the list and write down a sentence as quickly as possible. 
They were given two practice items. 
The Index of Anger and Aggression (author) was developed to provide 
both baseline information and to assess weekly changes in the levels of 
experienced anger and the frequency of assertive and aggressive behav-
iors. The use of a similar technique has been reported by other authors 
(Di Loreto, 1968; Hedquist and Weinhold, 1970). 
Subjects were instructed to keep daily records of interactions with 
men in which they felt any degree of anger or annoyance. They were told 
to briefly describe the situation, rate their level of anger from 1-100 
(1 being the least possible, 100 being extreme anger or rage), and then 
indicate whether their response was passive (said nothing or did not say 
what they thought or felt), assertive (told person what they thought or 
felt), or aggressive (told person what they thought but in a hostile 
manner or made put down statements). This index was returned to E each 
week and a new one given (Appendix B). Logs were collected one week 
prior to the beginning of training for each week during training, and 
one week after training had concluded. 
The Irration~i Belief Scale (Fox and Davies, 1971) is a set of 
sixty items based on the irrational beliefs and ideas outlined by Ellis 
(1962). The subject responds to the items on a five point scale, from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree, with higher scores reflecting 
higher levels of irrationality. This test was included to assess 
whether (a) the general level of irrational idea was affected by the 
training program and (b) whether training on one set of irrational 
beliefs transferred to other irrational beliefs. S 1 s completed the 
inventory during pre and post testing (Appendix B). 
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The Man-Woman Interaction~ (Psycholo~y Today modified by the 
author) was used to assess assertive and aggressive behaviors and 
feelings of anger during competitive play under high motivation ($10 to 
winner if 100 points were accumulated or $2 to winner independent of 
gained points) with a male (confederate). 
This game was felt to offer several advantages for this study: 
(a) pilot work had shown the game to be absorbing and interesting to 
the players; (b) it is set up so that the female player is at a dis-
tinct disadvantage; (c) the wording on the spaces and cards are aimed 
at illuminating women's disadvantaged position in society and in rela-
tionship to men (e.g., one space reads for the Woman "Rare skills make 
you executive assistant. Ahead 2. 11 For the Man "Same skill makes you 
executive. Ahead 4. 11 ) and, thereby, facilitating identification with 
the types of situations that were likely to arouse their anger; (d) 
the game is specifically designed for a male and female player and 
focuses on various male-female relationships (e.g., husband-wife, 
employer-employee, male-female colleagues); and (e) it is easy to 
administer, takes little space and equipment (a table and a game board), 
and can be played in a short time (20 minutes averageJ. 
The game was modified to further insure that the female player role 
(Woman) would be at a disadvantage. Cards were ordered such that the 
Woman would always lose, only cards were used in which the Woman would 
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gain a small number of points or more often would lose points. Cards 
were used or modified so that the Man would more often gain points than 
the Woman (a complete explanation of the game and the modifications 
appears in Appendix A). 
One major change in the game was providing a set of 20 blocking 
cards to each player with the instructions that "the blocking cards 
could be used at any time in the game to cause your opponent to lose a 
turn" (the confederate was instructed to use only one blocking card on 
either his first or second turn). 
The subjects played the game under the following guise: 
It is commonly assumed that men and women feel and act 
differently in competitive situations. Since there is an 
opportunity for one of you,to win as much as $10, I want to 
know how fairly each of you play the game and how you felt 
during the garrie. (Read to players by ~·) 
Each player was handed a Fairness Rating Scale (with fairness 
ratings from 1 (fair) to 5 (extremely unfair), and feelings ratings from 
1 (calm) to 100 (extremely angry). They rated how they were feeling and 
the fairness of their opponent when a tone sounded periodically through-
out the game (every three minutes). This was done to assess S•s feel-
ings throughout the game and to make it appear that the confederate was 
angry (he was instructed to mark high angry feelings between 75 and 95 
and to indicate that he thought she was playing unfairly with ratings of 
4: or 5 and to make his ratings where she could observe them). 
This measure provides an index of how much anger~ is experiencing 
during the game. The average was taken of all the ratings to indicate 
an overall measure of the amount of anger experienced. This procedure 
is similar to the "fear thermometer" ratings of anxiety reported by 
Lang (1963). This measure was included, as was Lang's, to enable pre 
and post comparisons of ~'s self reported affect level (in this study 
anger, in Lang's study anxiety) in the behavioral test situation. 
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The players were given in~tructions by!. for playing the game 
(moving number of spaces on a rolled dice, reading instructions on 
spaces, drawing cards, keeping points). The complete instructions 
appear in Appendix A. Special emphasis was given to the Special Bonus 
Space (SBS) "The player who reaches or passes this space first, draws 
one of the cards from his Special Bonus pile. This is a very important 
card and can dramatically alter the game. This is especially important 
if you are behind in the game." 
This is another major alteration in the basic game with the clearly 
marked space occurring halfway through the game. It was emphasized as 
important to provide an extra incentive for S to try to reach it. The 
only way~ can reach SBS is to use blocking cards to cause C to lose a 
turn. The game is set up (unknown to S) so that no matter which player 
reaches the SBS first, the roles are switched and Stakes the advanta-
geous Man role. This modification was done for several reasons: 
(1) It provides a measure of assertive behavior. The number 
of blocking cards that S used in an effort to reach SBS 
out of the number of opportunities available was the 
measure of assertiveness. The rationale for this being 
that this behavior is appropriate to achieving what she 
wants (i.e., to win the game, to win $10) and this is 
the only available alternative for doing so (the Woman 
role putting her at a distinct disadvantage). 
(2) It also provides a measure of aggressive behavior. The 
number of blocking cards that S used out of the number 
of opportunities available once she had switched to the 
Man (after one player reached SBS) was the aggressive 
score. The rationale for this was that since Sis now in 
the Man role, she has all the advantages and will win the 
game and efforts to thwart her opponent are punitive and 
unnecessary to the goal of winning the game. 
(3) It enables S to win the game and to win $2 (100 points 
are impossible to achieve) and hopefully dissipate any 
negative feelings aroused by the game because of the 
positive outcome. Since this game was administered both 
prior to and after treatment, explanations of procedures 
and the deceptions were not given. It was, therefore, 
felt to be important to try to minimize any negative 
effects. 
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In brief, the game is set up for two players, the Man and the 
Woman. Initially! plays as the Woman,and C as the Man. Halfway 
through the game, after one of the players reaches the SBS, roles are 
switched. ! plays the remainder of the game as the Man and C plays the 
rest of the game as the Woman. 
The game is played on a board with 76 spaces. Each player takes 
turns rolling a single die and moving the number of spaces rolled on the 
die. When spaces.so instruct, they draw cards (there are separate cards 
for the Woman and for the Man) and follow out the instructions on the 
cards (move ahead, move back, add points 1 lose points). ! keeps score 
of the number of points gained by each player and C keeps track of the 
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number of times S throws the die. This is done with a small hand 
adding machine and enables calculation of the number of blocking cards 
S used per the number of opportunities Shad to use a card (used to 
calculate the assertive and aggressive scores) • .£ covertly counted the 
number of blocking cards S used in each half of the game. He also 
noted which player reached the SBS first. Thus, with the exception of 
the anger ratings, C was responsible for collecting the measures from 
the game. 
Two C 1 s were used in the experiment. Both were advanced male 
undergraduates in psychology and both had had previous experience con-
• 
ducting experiments. They were both paid for their participation. Two 
£'s were used to facilitate testing and to enable testing each subject 
twice with a different person. S was led to believe that C was an 
undergraduate participating in the game for "extra credit." Every 
effort was made to keep this guise (writing out bogus credit slips, 
having C arrive a couple of minutes later than~' having Cask for 
instructions to be repeated, to appear unclear about the game). 
While this procedure offered certain advantages in trying to assess 
a behavioral measure of assertiveness and aggressive behavior, there 
were some limitations in the use of this game situation. 
(1) The measure of assertive behavior derived from the number 
of blocking cards used in the first half of the game is 
confounded with aggressive behavior. Even though the 
instructions strongly urge~ to try to reach SES first, 
it would be impossible to determine whether her behavior 
was motivated by a desire to win (assertiveness) or a 
desire to attack her opponent (aggressiveness). 
(2) The game as set up allows for only limited behavioral 
analysis (number of blocking cards used) and does not 
assess other types of assertive or aggressive responding 
(e.g., verbal behavior). 
(J) The value of the measurements depends on !'s involvement 
and identification and her "belief" that C is a naive 
subject. 
(4) As was set up,! plays with a stranger rather than 
someone that she has a relationship with which, to some 
degree, probably affected her involvement and "real 
life" type of responses. 
(5) Recording of !'s responses was left entirely up to C 
with no opportunity for cross validation. 
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The Attitude Toward Women Scale (AWS) (Spence and Helmreich, 1972) 
was used to assess the degree of feminist identification of the female 
subjects in the study. This is a 55 item questionnaire with four 
response alternatives (Agree Strongly, Agree Mildly, Disagree Mildly, 
and Disagree Strongly) with lower scores representing more traditional 
or conservative attitudes and higher scores reflecting liberal or pro-
feminist attitudes (Appendix B). Norms are provided for both male and 
female college students. This was included as a descriptive measure to 
better understand the type of female that participated in the study and 
to determine whether there was any relationship between type of atti-
tude (conservative or feminist) and interest in participation in the 
study. Or stated another way, were women who were concerned about anger 
or aggression in their relationships to men more traditional or liberal 
in their attitudes toward women? 
Testing for the study consisted of the following: 
~ Treatment Battery: The battery of scales administered prior 
to treatment included the Buss-Durkee Inventory, Scrambled Sentence 
Technique (List A), Index of Anger and Aggressive Behavior, Irrational 
Belief Scale, the Attitudes Toward Women Scale, and the Man-Woman 
interaction game. 
In Treatment Battery: The Index of Anger and Aggressive Behavior 
(Daily Log) was completed each week during treatment. 
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~ Treatment Battery: The battery of scales administered after 
treatment was identical .to the pre treatment battery with the exception 
of the Attitudes Toward Women Scale which was omitted and List B of the 
Scrambled Sentence Technique was given. 
Treatments 
Experimental Groups 
Experimental Group I and Experimental Group II consisted of eight 
and seven ~'s, respectively. These groups received the same treatment, 
the only difference being that one group met in the morning and the 
other the afternoon of the same day. The groups each met for two hours 
per week for four weeks. Experimenter(§_) lead all the group sessions 
and all sessions were taped with the knowledge of the S 1 s. The first 
two sessions were focused on identifying anger producing cognitions and 
teaching alternative rational statements. ~'s practiced relating these 
concepts to their own hierarchies (anger hierarchies produced in orien-
tation session and explained in the procedure section), identifying the 
irrational cognitions and practicing the rational statements. 
The following is an outline of the first two sessions. A more 
complete transcript appears in Appendix C. 
Session 1: 
(1) Orientation to group and purpose of meetings ( 11The purpose 
of our meetings will be to understand how we may be unnec-
essarily upsetting ourselves because of these situations 
and how we can approach them with less stress to ourselves 
and with more self control and determination."). 
(2) Rationale for viewing emotions as learned ("Since most 
or many of our emotions are learned, it is, therefore, 
possible to unlearn them or to learn to experience new 
or different emotions."). 
(3) How emotions are learned ("Emotions are for the most part 
a result of how we have learned to perceive or evaluate 
something."). 
(~) How feelings of anger arise. Examples of the perception 
of the event gave rise to anger. S selected items from 
her hierarchy and was asked to give examples of how other 
emotions could have been generated in the same situation. 
(5) Relations between feeling anger and acting aggressively. 
(Anger increases probability of acting aggressively, acting 
aggressively increases the experience of anger, even if 
angry not necessary to act aggressively.) 
(6) Advantages and disadvantages of anger and aggressive 
behavior. 
(7) Analysis of cognitive statements leading to anger. Diagram 
used (Landau, 1972) with "I have to have what I want now," 
"I can 1 t stand it," "It shouldn't be this way," and 
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"It•s because of them, they are to blame" statements. 
Session 2 
(1) Diagram with irrational beliefs was reviewed. 
(2) Alternative rational beliefs were presented at each point. 
~'s practiced the new rational statements at each point 
of the diagram. 
(3) S•s selected items from their own hierarchies and iden-
tified the irrational beliefs and generated rational 
cognitions. 
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The third and fourth session focused on differentiating assertive, 
aggressive, and passive behavior;! modeled several examples of each 
type of response and S•s rehearsed assertive responses to their 
hierarchy items. The following is an outline of Session 3 and 4 with 
a more detailed transcript appearing in Appendix C. 
Session 3 
(1) Differentiation of aggressive, passive, and assertive 
behaviors. 
(2) Presented chart developed by Alberti and Emmons (1970) 
spelling out differences in assertiveness, passiveness, 
and aggressiveness. _! modeled several examples. 
(3) Each~ identified an assertive, an aggressive, and a 
passive response to one of their lower hierarchy items. 
(4) Homework assignment. Choose one event this week where 
you might typically become angry and practice challening 
old thoughts and think new thoughts and act assertively 
rather than aggressively. Report to group. 
Session 1± 
(1) Reviewed assertion and aggression distinctions. 
(2) Each S chose two or three high level items from hierarchy 
and analyzed rational and irrational statements and 
practiced assertive responses. The group gave feedback. 
(3) S 1 s reported on homework assignment. 
Discussion Control Group 
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This group was included to control for the effects of meeting and 
attention. They met the same number of sessions as the experimental 
groups (two hours. per week for four weeks). They not only had pre and 
post testing, but they also kept Daily Logs of their interaction with 
men. There were seven subjects assigned to this group but one dropped out 
leaving only six. E met with the group and acted as a discussion 
facilitator. They were given the same orientation and rationale as the 
experiental groups but, in addition, they were told: "Women are finding 
that when they get together in small groups to share their feelings they 
come to a better understanding of themselves and other women." Each 
week they discussed items from their weekly logs and from their hier-
archies. They were encouraged to discuss their feelings of anger and 
asked to explore where they thought their anger came from and the rela-
tion between anger and aggressive behavior. E tried to facilitate dis-
cussion by asking questions and starting each of the sessions. E also 
tried to encourage the participation of all group members. E gave out 
no specific information nor did any formal training. 
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Minimal Contact Control GrouE 
Nine ~'s participated in this control group. They were each con-
tacted by phone and told "Your scores on the initial testing indicate 
that you do not need to participate in an ongoing group but we feel that 
it would be helpful for you to keep track of your interactions with men 
for a few weeks." If ~'s agreed to fill in the Daily Logs each week 
and come in for the post testing, they were told they would still 
receive maximum credit for participation in the study. This group then 
was involved in both the pre and post testing and filled in the Daily 
logs and returned them to Eby mail each week. All S 1 s in this group 
faithfully completed their Daily Logs and returned them to E. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
The analysis of results will be presented in two parts. First, 
consideration will be given to the relationship among the dependent 
variables. Then, each of the dependent variables will be evaluated 
with respect to treatment effects and pre post changes. 
Correlation of Dependent Variables 
In order to determine the relative independence of the dependent 
variables, a multiple correlation was run. The dependent variables are 
as follows: Buss-Durkee Total (BD T), Buss-Durkee Factor I (FI), 
Buss-Durkee Factor II (F II), Assertiveness-Game (Ass-g), 
Aggressiveness-_Game (Agg-g), Feefings-Game (Feel-g), Unfairness-Game 
(Unfair), Feelings- Log (Feel-I), Assertiveness--Log (Ass-1), and 
Aggressiveness-Log (Agg-1). The results are presented in Table II. 
Buss-Durkee Total and Factor II of the Buss-Durkee are signifi-
cantly (p<.01) correlated. This correlation is not surprising since 
Factor II represents a combination of five of the seven subscales of the 
Buss-Durkee. There were no other significant correlations. It is, 
therefore, reasonable to assume that the dependent measures are rela-
tively independent. The a~alysis of variance on these ten variables 
was, thereby, felt to be justified. 
BD T F I 
BD T x .54 









**p < .01 
TABIE II 
CORRELATION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES AT PRE TEST ONLY 
F II Ass-g Agg-g Feel-g Unfair Feel-I 
.86** -.08 -.13 .02 .36 .19 
.03 .01 -.10 .17 .40 .41 
x -.11 -.12 -.10 .17 .oo 
x .50 .20 -.03 -.08 
x .33 -.16 -.14 



























Analysis of Variance 
Pre and post test mean scores for all treatment groups are pre~ 
sented in Table III. These scores were subjected to an analysis of 
variance, multiple factor design, with repeated measures (Winer, 1962). 
There were four treatments considered at both pre test and post test, 
resulting in a 4 x 2 design with urtequal group size. The necessary 
assumptions for this type of analysis were tested by means of F max 
tests (Winer, 1962). None of the F max values was significant at the 
p<.01 level. The assumptions were supported. The summary of the 
analysis of variance on all ten dependent measures is presented in 
Table IV. 
Each of the ten dependent variables will be considered separately. 
Where the F statistic is significant, individual comparison were made by 
F probes (Winer, 1962). 
Buss-Durkee Total 
Analysis of variance revealed no significant main effect of treat-
ment. There was no main effect of pre vs. post differences. Inter~ 
action effects were not significant. 
Factor I 
Factor I of the Buss-Durkee represents a combination of two sub-
scales of the Buss-Durkee and is considered a factor equivalent to anger 
(Buss and Durkee, 1957). The analysis of variance showed a significant 
(p< .05) main effect of treatment. The four treatment means averaged 
over pre and post resulted in the following means: Experimental I, 7.0; 
Experimental II, 4.9, Control I, 9.2; and Control II, 5.4. From Table 
Ex:12 
Pre 
BD T .39. 4 
F I 8.5 
F II .30.9 
Ass-g 2.3.5 
Agg-g 9.9 






MEANS FOR ALL. TREATMENT GROUPS 
AT PRE AND POST TEST 
Gr:12 I E:!£12 Gr:12 II Control I 
Post Pre Post Pre Post 
.3.3. 0 .32 • .3 .31.7 .37.5 .39.2 
5. 4 5 • .3 4. 4 9 • .3 9.2 
27.6 26.7 27 • .3 28 • .3 .30.0 
20.1 51.1 45.6 25 • .3 26.8 
16.0 J4. 4 6.6 16.J 7.7 
18.4 24.7 2.3.0 20.0 .38.0 
20 • .3 22.6 14.o 21 • .3 22.0 
.35.1 .33.4 42.9 .31.8 38.8 
42.5 23.3 57.0 33.0 20.2 




.32 • .3 .3 .3 • .3 
4.9 5.8 
27 • .3 27.6 





50.4 .31. 2 
21.6 26.4 
TABLE IV 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR TEN DEPENDENT VARIABIES 
Buss:..:Durkee Total Factor I Factor II 
Source DF MS F Source MS F Source MS F 
Between S's Between S 1 s Between S•s 
A (Trmts) 3 137.38 1.31 A (Trmts) 61.53_ 3-53* A (Trmts) 19.73 .29 
Error bet. 26 105.14 Error bet. 17.42 Error 66.59 
Within S 1 s Within S 1 s Within S•s 
B (Pre-Post) 1 48.36 1.77 B (Pre-Post) 29.52 5.89* B (Pre-Post) 5.60 .28 
AB 3 41.48 1.76 AB 5.84 .83 AB 17.04 .83 
Error 26 ~7.36 Error 5.01 Error 20.31 
Assertive-game Aggressive-game Feelings-game 
Source MS F Source MS F Source MS F 
Between S•s Between S 1 s Between S•s 
A (Trmts) 1907.33 2.74 A (Trmts) 677.44 2.27 A (Trmts) 391.15 .72 
Error 695.18 Error 298.52 Error 547.10 
Within S's Within S 1 s Within S•s 
B (Pre-Post) 134.35 .32 B (Pre-Post) 525.40 4.36* B (Pre-Post) 70.37 .80 
AB 252.00 .81 AB 1077.44 8.93** AB 28.04 .33 
Error 305.17 Error 120.61 Error 84.36 
-.J 
\..) 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Unfairness-game Feelings-log 
Source MS F Source MS F 
Between S•s Between S•s 
A (Trmts) 173.27 1.03 A (Trmts) 494.55 .66 
Error 168.94 Error 749.48 
Within S's Within S 1 s 
B (Pre-Post) 502.28 7.51** B (Pre-Post) 206.40 3.18* 
AB 123.15 1.84 AB 130.30 2.01 
Error 66.92 Error 64.81 
Assertive-log Aggressive-log 
Source MS F Source MS F 
Between S 1 s Between S's 
A (Trmts) 604e19 .84 A (Trmts) 563.98 .84 
Error 708.90 Error 672.81 
Within S 1 s Within S 1 s 
B (Pre-Post) 49.00 .01 B (Pre-Post) 5.31 .01 
AB 2208.36 3. 75* AB 186.18 .49 
Error 589.41 Error 389.03 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 -...] ,i:-
III a look at the pre and post test means reveals that the greatest 
absolute change occurs in Experimental I and Experimental II with both 
decreasing. Control II shows an increase at post test. 
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The analysis of variance also revealed a main effect of pre~· 
post testing. All treatments summed over pre were 7.0. All treatments 
summed over post were 6.2. Even though the interaction effect is not 
significant, most of the significant pre-post effect seems to be the 
result of a decrease in Experimental I and Experimental II, since 
Control I shows a minimum decrement and Control II shows an increment. 
Factor II 
There was no significant main effect of treatment. Pre~· post 
changes were not significant. Interaction effects were not significant. 
Assertiveness-Game 
There was a non-significant (p< .10) trend in main effect of treat-
ments. The four treatment means averaged over pre and post are 
Experimental I, 21.8; Experimental II, 48.35, Control I, 26.00; and 
Control II, 20.45. An inspection of the pre and post test means in 
Table III shows that the greatest absolute change occurs in Experimental 
II and Control II. 
There was no significant main effect of pre vs. post treatment. 
There was no significant interaction effect. 
Aggressiveness-Game 
Analysis of variance revealed no main effect of treatments. There 
was a significant (p< .05) main effect of pre vs. post. All treatments 
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summed over pre equaled 16.4J. All treatments summed over post equaled 
9.25. This suggests that all treatments are having an effect in lower-
ing the aggressive game score. There was, however, a significant 
(p < .01) interaction effect. F probes of the interaction showed that 
at pre testing Experimental II was significantly (p< .01) greater than 
the other three treatments. Control I was significantly (p<.01) 
greater than Control I and Experimental II. These initial group differ-
ences suggest a sampling bias. At post testing Experimental I was sig-
nificantly (p<.05) greater than at pre testing. Experimental II and 
Control I significantly (p < .01) decreased from pre to post testing. 
Control II remained unchanged. The interaction effect was, therefore, 
the result of Experimental I significantly (p<.05) increasing from pre 
to post test while Experimental II and Control I significantly (p < .01) 
decreased. The rank order of the treatment means in absolute drop in 
aggression were Experimental II, Control I, and Control II. 
Feelings-Game 
There was no significant main effect of treatment. There was no 
significant main effect of pre vs. post. Interaction effects were not 
significant. 
Unfairness-Game 
Unfairness was considered an indirect measure of S 1 s anger in the 
game. She was asked to evaluate how fairly she thought .s:_ was playing 
the game. Since it was the game and not C that was unfair for~' this 
measure was thought to indirectly reflect ~'s anger. 
There was no significant main effect of treatment shown by the 
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analysis of variance. Main effect of pre vs. post differences was sig-
nificantly (p <.01). Summed over pre testing, treatments were equal to 
98.9. Summed over p.ost testing, treatments equaled 75.4. In terms of 
absolute drop from pre to post testing, a rank order of treatment means 
with amount of drop in parentheses is as follows: Experimental I (12.5~ 
Experimental II (8.6), Control II (3.1), and Control I which showed a 
small increase (.07). It appears that the main effect of pre~· post 
is largely accounted for by the drops in Experimental I and Experimental 
II. Interaction effects were not significant. 
Feelings-Log 
There was no main effect of treatment. There was a significant 
(p<.05) main effect of pre~· post testing. All treatment means 
summed over pre testing equaled 37.9. All treatment means summed over 
post testing equaled 41.7. This suggests that all treatment groups 
increased their number of anger responses from pre to post testing. 
Assertiveness-Log 
Analysis of variance revealed no main effect of treatment. Pre vs. 
post testing main effect was not significant. There was a significant 
(p<.05) interaction effect. F probes revealed that at pre testing 
Control II was significantly (p<.01) larger than all other treatments. 
This finding suggests a sampling bias. Considering pre to post test 
changes for all treatment groups, it was found that Experimental I did 
not significantly change from pre to post test, Experimental II signif-
icantly (p<.01) increased in assertive-log responses, Control I sig-
nificantly (p<.05) decreased in assertive-log responses, and Control II 
significantly (p <.01) decreased from pre to post testing. The inter-
action, therefore, is the result of Experimental II increasing while 
Control I and Control II decreased assertive-log responses. 
Aggressiveness-Log 
There was no significant main effect of treatment. There was no 
significant main effect of pre~ post test changes. Interaction 
effects were not significant. 
Supplementary Analyses 
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In addition to measures relating to assertiveness, aggressiveness, 
and anger, data was collected on two supplemental dimensions. They were 
concerned with attitudes toward women and irrational beliefs. 
Attitudes Toward Women 
Subjects completed the Attitudes Toward Women questionnaire prior 
to receiving treatment. This was given to assess the amount of feminist 
identification of the subjects in the study. Since this was a study 
related to feelings of anger in relationships to men, the question was: 
What type of woman chose to and/or met the criteria for inclusion in the 
study? 
Means were calculated for the combined experimental group (131.13) 
and for the combined control group (127.93), and the means were found to 
be statistically non-significant(.!_ .434). The overall mean for all 
subjects was found to be 129.53. 
Spence and Helmreich (1972) report normative data on 768 females 
collected at the University of Texas. The mean for their data was 98.21 
79 
with a standard deviation of 23.16. Only ten percent of their sample 
scored 129 or higher. 
The sample of women in this study were almost one and one-half 
standard deviations above the norm reported by Spence and Helmreich. 
From this data, it is concluded that women in this study had a very 
strong feminist identification. 
Irrational Beliefs 
Subjects completed the Adult Irrational Ideas scale (Inventory 
of Irrational Beliefs) at both pre and post testing. This was to 
determine whether training on one irrational set of beliefs (anger) led 
to a reduction in irrational responding in general. To answer this 
question, means and.! tests were computed for the combined experimental 
and combined control at pre and post testing. Results are presented in 
Table V. 
TABLE V 
MEANS AND t TESTS FOR EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS 
AT PRE AND POST TEST ON ADULT IRRATIONAL IDEAS 
Pre Post 
Experimental 175.9 165.7 
Control 175.7 173.5 
t c03 






The results in Table V show that at pre testing the experimental 
and control group are essentially the same. At post testing, there is a 
trend though non significant (p< .16) showing a reduction in irrational 
responding for the experimental group relative to the control group. 
Considering the experimental group alone, there is a strong but non 
significant (p< .11) trend showing a reduced amount of irrational 
responding at post test. For the control group, the pre-post differ-
ences are not significant. 
Therefore, the data shows that training on one set of irrational 
beliefs (anger) produces a strong tendency to lower irrational respond-
ing in general. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
In the first part of the discussion, the three hypotheses derived 
from Ellis' Rational-Emotive system will be evaluated with regard to the 
analysis of the results. Then will follow a critique of the experimen-
tal procedures and an evaluation of the treatment groups. Finally, 
suggestions for further research will be considered. 
Aggressiveness 
The first hypothesis predicted that subjects receiving cognitive-
behavioral training would reduce their aggressiveness relative to the 
discussion control and the minimal contact control groups. This was 
evaluated by Factor II on the Buss-Durkee scale, Aggressive-Game 
responses, and Aggressive-Log responses. 
Support for this hypothesis is reflected in one of the cognitive-
behavioral training groups (Experimental II). On the Aggressive-Game 
measure, Experimental II showed a decrement in aggressive responding 
following treatment. Experimental II also showed a decrement in 
Aggressive-Log responses following treatment even though this decrease 
was not statistically significant. 
On the Aggressive-Game measure, Experimental I showed an increment 
in aggressive behavior which was not in the predicted direction. On 
this same measure, Control I showed a decrement in aggressive responding 
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after treatment. These findings do not support hypothesis one. 
An inspection of the pre test means in Table III reveals that 
Experimental II and Control I both had a large number of Aggressive-Game 
responses initially. Since both groups showed a decrement following 
treatment, this raises a question of whether the treatment procedures 
are most effective with individuals who are initially higher in aggres-
sive responding. Or looked at in another way, these two groups are the 
only ones that had an opportunity to change since there is little possi-
bility of changing unless the initial scores are high. It is also 
possible that the decrements observed in Experimental II and Control I 
are a result of regression toward the mean. 
The results on both Factor II and Aggressive-Log did not support 
hypothesis one. Therefore, the results for hypothesis one that the 
cognitive-behavioral training groups would reduce their aggressive 
responding relative to the discussion control and the minimum contact 
control are inconclusive. On the Aggressive-Game measure, the 
cognitive-behavioral training procedures were effective in reducing 
aggressive behavior for •one of the training groups. In addition, the 
discussion control group was equally effective in reducing Aggressive-
Game responding. 
Assertiveness 
The second hypothesis predicted that the cognitive-behavioral 
training groups would increase their assertiveness relative to the dis-
cussion control and the minimum contact control groups. This hypothesis 
was evaluated by the Assertive-Game measure and the Assertive-Log 
measure. 
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Support for this hypothesis is found in the Assertive-Log but not 
in the Assertive-Game responses. On the Assertive-Log measure, one of 
the cognitive-behavioral training groups (Experimental II) showed an 
increment in assertive ~esponding while the two control groups showed a 
decrement in assertive responses following treatment. Experimental I 
showed a nonsignificant pre to post test change. 
The As~ertive-Game responses did not support hypothesis two. It is 
possible that the method of determining assertive responses in the game 
was masking any treatment effects. As was discussed in Chapter IV on 
"Method," the assertive response measure is probably confounded with 
aggressiveness. While S 1 s were instructed to try to reach the Special 
Bonus Space first, the use of blocking cards to do so might have been 
perceived by them as an aggressive response. While this was intended to 
be a measure of assertiveness, it remains unclear exactly what was being 
measured. In addition, the assertive measure was always assessed'at the 
beginning of the game and, thereby, subject to novelty effects and 
"warm-up 11 effects. 
The results for hypothesis two that the cognitive-behavioral train-
ing groups would increase assertive responding relative to the discus-
sion control group and the minimum contact control group are 
inconclusive. On the Assertive-Log measure, one cognitive-behavioral 
group and the two control groups were in the predicted direction. On 
the same measure, the other cognitive-behavioral training group did not 
increase assertive responding. 
Anger 
The third hypothesis predicted that the cognitive-behavioral 
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training groups would reduce anger responses relative to the discussion 
control and the minimum contact control groups. This hypothesis was 
evaluated by Factor.I of the Buss-Durkee, Feelings-Game, Unfairness--
Game, and Feelings-Log responses. 
Support for this hypothesis is found on two out of the four 
measures of anger. On Factor I of the Buss Durkee scale, Experimental I 
and Experimental II both showed large absolute decreases from pre to 
post test relative to Control I which showed a slight decrease and 
Control II which showed a small increase. Even though the interaction 
was not $ignificant, the main effect of treatment and of pre~· post 
appears to be largely accounted for by the changes in Experimental I.and 
Experimental II. 
The Unfairness measure from the game revealed that the pre post 
differences tn Experimental I and Experimental II largely contributed 
to the main effect of pre~· post differences. Control II also showed 
a slight decrement and Control I showed a slight increment. 
The Feelings-Game measure revealed no effect of treatment. This is 
an interesting finding in light of the Unfairness measure which, as 
discussed in the Results section (Chapter V), was considered an indirect 
measure of anger. There are several possibilities that might explain 
this result. One, is that since the Unfairness measure asked S to rate 
£'s behavior, she may have been more willing to reveal negative feel-
ings. In line with this.are the demand characteristics of the experi-
ment. S•s volunteered on the basis of "difficulties with hostility in 
interactions with men" and may have perceived that they were supposed 
to get "better," that is, experience less hostility in interaction with 
men. If this effect was operating, ~'s may very well have minimized 
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their report of anger feelings especially in a situation where they may 
have thought they were being observed (game). Another possibility is 
that the subjects actually did not experience much anger since they were 
playing the game with a strange'r viewing it as a "game" and, thereby, 
not becoming very emotionally involved. 
A third possibility is that the ten level discrimination of £eel-
ings that the Feelings-Game rating required was more difficult for S to 
make than the five level discrimination required by the Unfairness 
rating. Even though~ had training in the orientation session in making 
these discriminations, it is still possible that a ten level discrimina-
tion was difficult. 
The Feelings-log measure also did not support the hypothesis. The 
pre vs. post main effect revealed that S's increased in their number of 
anger feelings. This finding would seem to contradict the argument on 
demand characteristics discussed above. If the same demand, that is, to 
decrease hostility were operating it would be expected that the groups 
would decrease rather than increase their report of angry feelings. 
Possibly another demand was operating on the logs. Since S's were 
instructed to fill in the logs each day, recording any interaction in 
which they experienced negative feelings, the demand may have been per-
ceived that it is "good" to record negative feelings but the "best" 
behavior to report is assertiveness rather than aggressiveness. 
Another possibility to explain the increase in reported anger feelings 
is that with practice ~'s became better able to discriminate different 
levels of anger. Therefore, the initial ratings may reflect some random 
rating whereas the latter ratings might reflect a more accurate estimate 
of what S experienced. This rating also required a ten level 
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discrimination of feelings, similar to the Feelings-Game rating. As 
discussed above, this rating may have been too difficult to make, 
resulting in an inaccurate estimate of what! was experiencing. 
,': ,-,.·. 
The results':for hypothesis three that the cognitive-behavioral 
training groups would decrease their anger feelings relative to the 
discussion control and the minimum contact control are, therefore, 
inconclusive. On two of the four measures of anger, the results were 
in the predicted direction. 
Critique of Procedures 
Since each of the hypotheses tested resulted in ambiguous results, 
an overall examination of the procedures will be presented to evaluate 
the part they might have played in contributing to th~ inconclusive 
findings. 
The demand characteristics of the experiment in general and in 
relation to some of the measures has been alluded to briefly in the 
discussion of the results. The procedures of this study will be eval-
uated using Orne's (1962) definition of demand characteristics as the 
"totality of cues which convey an experimental hypothesis to the sub-
ject. 11 The general announcement to recruit subjects suggested that the 
study was to "help" women to deal more effectively with hostility in 
r~lationships. Also, the orientation given to all subjects indicated 
that the purpose was to consider other ways of relating other than with 
hostility. Both of these statements probably convey quite clearly to 
subjects that they are "expected" to reduce their hostility and relate 
differently to men. There are several instances where this demand may 
have affected the results in the study. 
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While playing the game both at pre test and post test, subjects 
were asked to rate their feelings of anger during the situation. If the 
subjects perceived that the "expectation" was that they were to reduce 
their hostility, this may very well hay-e affected how they made their 
rating. Since the experimentor was present to give instructions for the 
game, the subjects may have thought that they were being observed which 
could have added to any desire the subjects had to "appear to do well." 
This effect might have operated to conceal any effects of treatment. 
Each of the subjects was required to report daily interactions with 
men in which they felt any degree of annoyance up to and including 
feelings of rage. They were to rate both their feelings and their 
behavior in these instances. The instructions to the Daily Log give a 
brief description of the kind of situation in which they are to report 
and give a definition of assertive, aggressive, and passive behavior 
(see Appendix B). With regard to reporting their feelings in situa-
tions, subjects may have perceived that it was "expected" that they give 
frequent reports of their feelings of anger in interactions with men 
but that it was more desirable to behave assertively rather than 
aggressively. This may partly account for the result that there were 
no significant treatment effects revealed on the Feelings-Log measure 
and may have contributed to an increment in anger feelings from pre to 
post testing. With regard to the reporting of their behavior in the 
situations, subjects in the cognitive-behavioral training groups 
(Experimental I and Experimental II) may very well have "learned" that 
one of the purposes of the training groups was to increase assertive 
responses. This demand may have been operating in the logs for the 
experimental groups but not the control groups. 
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Another aspect of the procedures that probably contributed to the 
ambiguous results has to do with the measures used in the experiment. 
The measures of assertiveness and aggressiveness developed by the author 
in the game situation were derived logically and not subjected to cross 
validation studies with other measures of assertiveness and aggressive-
ness used in the experiment (e.g., Buss-Durkee Factor I, Factor II, 
Assertiveness and Aggressiveness-Log responses). This raises questions 
as to whether the measures of assertiveness and aggressiveness in the 
game were at all related to the other measures of assertiveness and 
aggressiveness in the study. If the measures were unrelated, this could 
produce the kind of results found in this study where some measures 
showed an effect of treatment and others did not. For example, if 
assertiveness on the game was measuring something different from asser-
tiveness on the log, this might partially explain why the Assertive-Log 
responses revealed an effect of treatment while Assertive-Game res.ponses 
did not. The same would hold true for the measures of aggressiveness 
and anger. 
Another consideration closely related to the problem of cross 
validation has to do with how closely the measures were able to evaluate 
the effects of treatment. It might be argued that the measures of 
assertiveness and aggressiveness on the game may not have been able to 
accurately assess the effects of the training program. The training 
program focused primarily on verbal behavior wheras the game measures 
were of non-verbal behavior. 
In addition to the above considerations of the measures, there is 
also the problem of reliability and accuracy of self-report measures. 
The Feelings-Game measure has already been discussed describing how the 
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demand characteristics of the experiment may have contributed to 
inaccuracy in reporting. The Daily Log measures are open to question 
as to how accurately they measure the subjects responses. These were 
also discussed in relation to the demand characteristics of the experi-
ment. The Daily Logs also are subject to variability in how soon after 
the event the responses were recorded. Orne (1970) discusses the prob-
lems with this type of measure that relies on immediacy of recording. 
Since there was no opportunity to validate either the immediacy or 
accuracy of the subject's recordings, the results on this measure are 
open to question. 
A final procedural issue concerns subjec~ selection. Subjects were 
included based only on the results of the Buss-Durkee Total score. As 
a result, two measures (Aggressiveness-Game, Assertiveness-Log) revealed 
initial group differences. An inspection of the pre-treatment means in 
Table III suggests that the treatment groups may have been initially 
different on several other variables (e.g., Assertiveness-Game, 
Feelings-Log, and Aggressiveness-Log). This raises two possibilities. 
One, that pre treatment differences could have been minimized if 
subjects were chosen on the basis of more than one criterion. Also, 
the possibility is raised that initial group variability might have been 
operating to cover up any effects of treatment. 
Evaluation of Treatments 
Initially the discussion group and the minimum contact group were 
conceived·as control groups for the two experimental groups. The dis-
cussion group was to control for the effects of meeting together and 
discussing interactions with men. The minimum contact group was 
considered a control for repeated testing and daily recordings of 
feelings and behavior. Upon further consideration, these groups might 
be thought of as additional treatment groups. 
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The discussion control group might more appropriately be viewed as 
a focused discussion treatment group. Even though this group was not 
given the specific training experiences as the cognitive-behavioral 
training groups, they met each week and discussed their interactions 
with men and gave each other feedback and suggestions. They often dis-
cussed the instances of interactions with men that they recorded on 
their Daily Logs. Many of the suggestions they made to each other were 
in effect "act assertively rather than aggressively." On at least one 
measure, Aggressiveness-Game, this group was as effective in reducing 
aggressiveness as one of the cognitive-behavioral training groups. 
The minimum contact group did not meet together but was told, 
"Your scores on the initial testing indicate that you do not need to 
participate in an ongoing group, but we feel that it would be helpful 
for you to keep track of your interaction with men for a few weeks." 
This instruction could have been perceived as an "expectation" that 
their behavior would change if they recorded their interactions with 
men. With this type of set, this group might better be thought of as 
a self-monitoring treatment group. McFall (1970) has clearly demon-
strated that self recording of behavior can in, and of, itself modify 
behavior. On one measure of the Daily Log (Assertiveness) the minimum 
contact group showed a decrement from pre to post test. Since this 
change is not in the expected direction, it is difficult to interpret 
whether this is a random fluctuation or whether recording the behavior 
effected it. 
Both Experimental I and Experimental II received the same 
cognitive-behavioral training procedures. On two measures (Assertive-
Log and Aggressive-Game), these groups did not replicate. On the 
Aggressive-Game measure, this may be partly the result of initial 
differences between the groups. In addition, in the instances where 
the groups did not replicate, Experimental II was in the predicted 
direction, whereas, Experimental I was not. 
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Even though both the training groups received the same treatment, 
there were two factors which may have contributed to some differences. 
Experimental I always met in the morning and Experimental II met in the 
afternoon of the same day. As a result, sometimes group members in 
Experimental I were late arriving for the group which either delayed the 
start of the group or interrupted the group when members came late. 
This combined with the early morning hour and its effects on both the 
subjects and the experimenter may have introduced an uncontrolled 
difference in the two groups. 
Another factor, which probably affected Experimental I, relates 
to the charismatic qualities of one group's member. She was very proud 
of her 11 ag1;1ressive" behavior and resisted any suggestions from the group 
or experimenter that she could be more effective if she were more 
"assertive" rather than "aggressive". She often would dominate the 
group and spend most of the meeting describing her various "aggressive" 
interactions with men. She elicited laughter from the group and seemed 
to be approved by the group. She probably emerged as the most effective 
leader in that group modeling aggressive rather than assertive behavior. 
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Implications for Future Research 
Even though the results of this study are inconclusive, this study 
does point to the fruitfulness of using Ellis' rational~emotive pro-
cedures in reducing anger and aggressiveness. Other studies are needed 
to clarify and extend the results of this study. For example, a larger 
more representative sample of both males and females is needed to 
determine how much the strong pro feminist bias of the female subjects 
affected the outcomes in the study. Other types of behavioral measures, 
for example, those described by McFall and his associates (McFall and 
Marston, 1970; McFall and Lillesand, 1971) would help to remove the con-
founding of assertive and aggressive scores found in the Man-Woman game 
and lead to more clear results. In addition, the use of both behavioral 
as well as self-report criterion measures would reduce the initial 
between group variability and make the results more interpretable. 
The findings in this report suggest that assertive training may 
have an effect on reducing aggressive behavior. More research is needed 
to clarify the results in this study. This appears to be a much needed 
area of research which would have direct application to both theory and 
clinical practice. 
Since demand characteristics are so often a problem in a therapy 
analog type of experiment, efforts should be made to obtain covert 
measures of behavior when the subject does not "know" that he is being 
observed. McFall (1970) presents a design in which an experimental 
accomplice rates a subject's behavior in a "natural" setting. This 
design helps to diminish the effects of demand characteristics and also 
gives an opportunity to evaluate in what ways this effect is operating. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY 
This study investigated the effects of cognitive-behavioral train-
ing procedures on the reduction of anger and aggression. Analyses and 
procedures based on Ellis' Rational-Emotive Therapy system were used. 
In addition, assertive training techniques developed by behavior ther-
apists were employed. Ellis' Rational-Emotive system which is derived 
from cognitive-learning theory led to the following predictions: (a) 
subjects in the cognitive-behavioral training groups would decrease 
their amount of aggressive behavior, (b) subjects in the cognitive-
behavioral training groups would increase their assertive behavior, and 
(c) subjects in the cognitive-behavioral training groups would reduce 
their angry feelings. The results for each of these hypotheses were 
inconclusive. 
The two cognitive-behavioral groups met in training groups for two 
hours per week for four weeks. The discussion control group also met 
in a group for two hours per week for four weeks but did not receive 
training. The minimum contact control group did not meet but was in-
volved in both pre and post testing and filling out daily logs of their 
behavior. All subjects were evaluated at both pre treatment and post 
treatment on a variety of measures designed to assess aggressiveness, 
assertiveness, and anger responses. 
The two cognitive-behavioral training groups were evaluated 
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separately to determine whether they would replicate. On two measures, 
Aggressiveness-Game and Assertiveness-Log, these groups failed to rep-
licate. In both instances, this was the result of one group (Experi-
mental I) not being in the predicted direction. Differences between the 
two groups were discussed that may have contributed to these results. 
With regard to the hypothesis on aggressions, one measure out of 
three revealed a change in the predicted direction. This, however, was 
true for only one of the cognitive-behavioral groups. In addition, the 
discussion control group was equally as effective on this measure as the 
cognitive-behavioral group. 
On the two measures of assertiveness, one revealed results in the 
predicted direction. The interaction effect was significant (p <.05) 
which was the result of one cognitive-behavioral training group showing 
an increment in assertive responding and the two control groups showing 
a decrement. The other cognitive-behavioral training group remained 
unchanged. 
There were three measures of anger in this study. On only one 
measure did the cognitive-behavioral training seem effective in reduc-
ing anger. This was found for only one of the training groups. 
Because of the inconclusive findings in this study, a careful 
critique of the procedures was presented. The discussion focused on the 
demand characteristics of the experiment, problems in cross validation, 
and reliability and accuracy of subject recording. In addition, the 
control groups were considered in light of the types of treatment that 
may have been occurring in these groups. Suggestions for further 
research were presented. 
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APPENDIX A 
MAN-WOMAN GAME INSTRUCTIONS AND MODIFICATIONS 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAN-WOMAN GAME 
After the Sand the Care seated at the playing board they are 
both read the following instructions: 
It is commonly assumed that men and women feel .and act dif-
ferently in competitive situations. Since there is an 
opportunity for one of you to win as much as $10, I want to 
know how fairly each of you play the game and how you felt 
during the game. 
10.5 
Both are handed the Fairness Rating Scale (with fairness ratings ranging 
from 1 (fair) to 5 (extremely unfair), and feelings ratings fromO (calm) 
to 100 (extremely angry). They are then instructed: 
At least five times during the game, rate your opponent's 
fairness in playing the game. You may give as many ratings 
as you want, but at least give five. In order to determine 
how you are feeling throughout the game, a beep will sound 
periodically. When you hear the beep indicated here (points 
to feelings column on Fairness Rating Sheet) what you are 
feeling right then. The object of the .game is to reach space 
76 first. The one to reach this point first will win $2 but 
if in addition you accumulate 100 points you will win a total 
of.· $10. To play, select a token and roll a dice to determine 
who moves first. Then take turns rolling a dice and moving 
the number of spaces on the dice. Each space that you land 
on has an instruction, read it aloud and do what it says. 
If you move as a result of carrying out an instruction, 
ignore the instruction on the space that you land on. Here 
are three sets of cards you will draw from (pointing to each), 
the Power cards, the Confrontation cards, and the Status 
cards. You (~) draw from the female deck and you (~) draw 
from the male deck. Read the card aloud and follow the 
instructions. If you land on a space requiring you to answer 
a question, select a number from 1 to 200 and your opponent 
will read the question. If you land on a Confrontation s.pace, 
each of you draw a card, the one with the highest number 
advances J spaces. In addition each of you have 20 blocking 
cards which can be used at anytime throughout the game to 
cause your opponent to lose a turn. If you want to block your 
opponent, put one of your cards beside his/her token before 
the dice is rolled. To give time to use blocking cards, pause 
a few seconds before tossing the dice. After your opponent 
has missed a turn, remove your blocking card to a discard 
pile. You will notice that spce 38 is marked Special Bonus. 
The player who reaches or passes this space first, draws one 
of the cards from his Special Bonus pile. This is a very 
important card and can dramatically alter the game and is 
especially important if you are behind in the game. Someone 
needs to keep track of the number of turns in the game. 
(looking to C) Will you do this? (to~) Will you keep 
track of the number of points each of you make by keeping 
a running total? Are there any questions? Let me know when 
you have finished playing. 
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Man-Woman Game Spaces With Modifications 
The following is a listing of the instructions on each of the 76 
spaces on the board. Modifications are noted in pare~theses. 
1. blank 
2. WOMAN Caution will get you nowhere. 




J. WOMAN Career Counselor convinces you to go to typing school. -5pts. 
MAN You're advised of your best college bet. +5 
4. WOMAN Ladies don't compete. Start over! 
5. WOMAN Draw Status card. 
MAN Draw Power card. 
6. Draw Status card. 
7. WOMAN Husband wants you at home. Lose 1 turn for working. 
MAN Wife stops working. Ahead 5. 
8. Confrontation. 
9. Draw Power card. 
10. Answer question. WOMAN Right, no points. Wrong, -5. 
MAN Right, +5. Wrong, no loss. 
11. Draw Status card. 
12. Confrontation. 
13. New lover renders you powerless. Give unto her or him 1 Power card. 
14. Confrontation. 
15. Back 1 space. 
16. Draw Power card. 
17. WOMAN It•s that time of the month again. Lose .5 points. 
MAN Convince secretary "cramps" are no excuse for poor work. Take 
5 points. 
18. WOMAN Bonus for looking pretty. +5 points. 
MAN Bonus for working hard. +10 points. 
19. WOMAN You do the dishes. Lose 1 turn. 
MAN You have after dinner brandy with guests. Ahead J. 
108 
20. Draw Power card. 
21. Draw Status card. 
22. Confrontation. 
23 • WOMAN Back 1. 
MAN Ahead 7 (Ahead 2) 
24. Answer question. If right; +5, wrong, -5. 
25. Draw Power card. 
26. WOMAN You feel guilty leaving kids while you wo:rk. Lose 5 points. 
MAN It's not your problem. Get 5 points. 
27. Draw, Status card. 
28. Draw Status card. 
29. WOMAN Affair with boss. Ahead 3. 
MAN Affair with boss's wife. Ahead 5. 
JO. Confrontation. 
Jl. WOMAN Draw Status card. 
MAN Draw Power card. 
J2. Take Power qtrd. 
33. Initiate Confrontation. Opponent chooses method. (Initiate 
Confrontation) 
34. WOMAN Rare skills make you executive assistant. Up 2. 
MAN Same skills make you executive. Up 4. (Up 3) 
35. WOMAN Back 2. 
MAN Ahead 6. 
36. Draw Status card. 
37. Draw Power card. 
38. Hold. Answer question. If correct, +15, Wrong, back to start. 
(Special Bonus) 
39. WOMAN Boss's wife find out about your affair with boss. Back 2. 
MAN Boss's wife gets boss to promote yoµr Ahead 1. 
40. Confrontation. 
41. WOMAN Boss gets you pregnant, lose job. Back 1. 
MAN You convince her .that it's her fault. Ahead 1. 
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42. Confrontation. 
43. WOMAN Your instinctive cqmpassion gives 5 pts. to low male. 
MAN Remember your pregnant secretary? 5 pts. to any lady for your 
guilt. 
44. Draw Status card. 
45. Draw Status card. 
46. Draw Power card. 
47. Ahead 1 space. (MAN Ahead 1 space) 
48. Confrontation. 
49. WOMAN Women in your office organize. Ahead 4. 
MAN No woman's group affects YOU. 
50. Draw Status card. 
51. Draw Power card. 
52. Sexy opponent freezes you. A 5 or 9 will thaw you. So will giving 
him or her 5 pts. 
53. Draw Power card. 
54. WOMAN If teaming move up 
MAN You're outnumbered. 
until you roll 3 or 4. 
55. Draw Power card. 
5, if not tough. 
Admit women are equal, -5 or stay put 
56. WOMAN Go make coffee and lose turn •.. 
MAN Pat all the ladies condescendingly as you move them Back 1. 
57. WOMAN If team, draw power; otherwise status. 
MAN Draw Status card. 
58. Kiss hand and/or feet of ap opposite, as you take his or her 
blocking card. 
59. Draw Power card. 
60. Draw Status card. 
61. Confrontation. 
62. Answer question. WOMAN Right, +5, wrong, lose no points. 
MAN Right, no points, wrong, -5. 
63. Back 2 spaces (WOMAN Back 2 spaces) 
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64. WOMAN Take Power card. 
MAN Take Status card. 
65. Promotion! Do not advance unless you have points to win otherwise 
back to hold. (MAN A):lead 5; WOMAN Back 5) 
66. Your grip slips, lose one power card. 
67. Draw St1;1.tus card. 
68. Answer question. Right, no points. Wrong, back 3. 
69. WOMAN Hire a male secretary, +5 points. 
MAN Your secretary adopts hands off policy. -5 points. 
70. Draw Power card. 
71. Men say you are overly competitive. Back 4. Women admire your 
aggressiveness. Ahead 1. (WOMAN Men say you are overly competi-
tive. Back 4. Women admire your aggressiveness.) 
72. WOMAN Boss says you I re pretty smart for a "woman. 11 Ahead 1. 
MAN Too late in the game for that sort of crack. Lose turn (lose 
5 points) 
73. Draw Status card. 
74. Confrontation. 
75. WOMAN Is a career what you really want? Back up 8 and think it 
over. 
MAN What price glory? Back 2. 
76. Blank. 
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Man-Woman Game Power Cards With Modifications 
The following is a list of the Power carq.s usec;l with the instruc-
tions. There are separate decks of cards for the MAN and for the WOMAN. 
Modifications are noted in parentheses. 
MAN 
As a handsome young professor, you have made hundreds of female students 
adore you. They obey your every word, even when you tell all female 
players to move 5 spaces back and give you 5 points. 
As a man, you feel that you have the right to dominate any woman in the 
game. Your self-confidence allows you to take 10 poirits from any female 
player and add them to your own score. 
You are a male boss who takes pleasure in bullying his female employees. 
All women in game, shaking in fear, lose 5 points; you get them. 
As a man of power and prestige, you find that women cower in your 
presence. Arrogantly, take 5 points from every female player for being 
so weak. 
As family breadwinner, you get to choose where family lives. Outvote 
wife and move to Arizona. Any female in game must give you 10 points 
or 1 stumbling block (1 stumbling block omitted) to get back to her job 
in New York. 
Practice saying, "Honey, how can you be so dumb?" until a woman wonders 
the same thing. You may take 5 points from any female player for your 
automatically perfect performance. 
You are such a brilliant and witty speaker that women are incapable of 
arguing with you. Talk any female player into the joys of moving back 
7 steps. 
Your deep resonant voice gives you instant authority in groups. Inter-
rupt any blathering female player and move her back 4, spaces. 
WOMAN 
When you flutter your eyelashes, strong men crumble. Your ~mil<,) m~lt$ 
the iciest hearts. Defrost any man out of 10 pts (5 pts), and add thEeim 
to your score. 
Mother told you that the way to a man's heart was through his stomach, 
and you took her advice. Men will pay anything for one of your home-
cooked meals. Take 10 points (5 points) from the male dinner guest of 
your choice. 
WOMAN (Continued) 
You are a strikingly beautiful woman, and men let you get away with 
murder. Also points. Take 5 pts. from each man and add them to your 
score. 
You are a pathologically dependent woman. The male object of your 
affections moves back 8 spaces (2 spaces) because you are clinging to 
his leg. 
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You are every man's favorite Dumb Blonde; gorgeous but idiotic. All men 
in game move 2 steps ahead to be near you, and 6 steps back when you 
try to explain Darwinian theory. 
You are a woman with an IQ of 175, and that makes you smarter than any 
man around. Outthink 10 pts (5 pts) from any male player and add them 
to your score. 
You are a woman who dominates any situation by screaming until you get 
your way. All male players take 2 steps backwards to get away from you, 
and give you 5 points each to shut you up. 
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Man-Woman Status Cards With Modifications 
The following is a list of the Status cards used and their instruc-
tions. There are separate decks of cards for the MAN and for the WOMAN. 
Modifications are noted in parenthes~s. 
MAN 
You convince your female colleagues that they really wouldn't be happy 
disrupting an all-male professional group. Gain 10 STATUS QUO points. 
You become the new sales manager, even though a woman was more quali-
fied. Gain 5 STATUS QUO points. 
You have a wife who does what you tell her, never contradicts you in 
public, impresses your clients with perfect dinner parties, and runs 
her life around you. Gain 10 STATUS QUO points while you can. 
In conversation, you get a woman to admit that men are better leaders 
and decision maker than women. Gain 5 STATUS QUO points. 
When a bright woman chemist applies for a research job on your staff, 
you hire her as a lab technician. Gain 5 STATUS QUO points. 
As a college counselor, you have just convinced another girl undergrad 
that she shouldn't go to medical school (she'll become too masculine). 
Gain 10 STATUS QUO points. 
You've just divorced your wife of JO years for a sweet young 22-year-old 
who makes you feel young again. Gain 10 STATUS QUO points. 
You are hired as an associate professor at a good college, while your 
equally talented wife becomes an instructor at the local girl's school. 
Gain 5 STATUS QUO points. 
You teach your son to get lots of "experience" (heh heh) in his youth, 
and your daughter that she damn well stay a virgin till marriage. Gain 
5 STATUS QUO points. 
Your wife drops out of college to support you through medical school. 
Gain 5 STATUS QUO points. 
You tell a "dumb woman" joke at a party and everyone, even your wife, 
laughs, gain 5 STATUS QUO POINTS. 
Your parents were so delighted to have a male child that you got 5 
·ST'ATUS QUO points at birth. Cash them in for points now. 
You are paid more than the women in your company who do the same work 
as you. They get less impressive titles, you get 5 STATUS QUO points. 
MAN (Continued) 
You've convinced the bright Ph.D. you just married that she shouldn't 
be competing with you. Gain 10 STATUS QUO points. 
WOMAN 
You are paid less than the men in your company who do the same work. 
Lose 5 STATUS points. 
You are a woman. Automatically lose 5 STATUS points. 
Your college adviser convinces you that women make better nurses than 
doctors. When you change majors from pre-med to English, you lose 10 
STATUS points. 
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You have an M.A. in biology. Wh,en you apply for a research job, you are 
told there is a nice secretarial position open. You accept, losing 5 
STATUS points. 
You are passed over for a better position by a man who is less qualified 
than you are. Lose 10 STATUS points. 
You stop going to your Women's Liberation group meetings when your 
husband calls the women a "bunch of frustrated dykes." Lose 5 STATUS 
points. 
You are the only woman psychologist on your research team. At staff 
meetings, the.men assign you the tasks of taking notes and serving 
coffee. You agree losing 5 STATUS points. 
You always do what your husband says when it comes to politics and 
business. Lose 5 STATUS points. 
Having just gotten your Ph.D. you get married and drop career plans 
forever. For shame! Lose 15 STATUS points. 
You want an abortion. The state legislature is all male. You lose 10 
STATUS points. 
You drop out of school to support your husband through graduate school. 
Lose 5 STATUS points. 
You play dumb on an exam so you won't surpass your boyfriend, even 
though you know more than he does. Lose 5 STATUS points. 
Your husband is so slow to do his chores around the house ("but 
nothing's dirty, dear") that you give in and do them yourself. Lose 5 
STATUS points. 
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1. I seldom strike back, even if someone hits me first. 
2. I sometimes spread gossip about people I don't like. 
3. Unless somebody asks me in a nice way, I won't do what they want. 
4. I lose my temper easily but get over it quickly. 
5. I don•t seem to get what's coming to me. 
6. I know that people tend to talk about me behind my back. 
7. When I disapprove of my friends I behavio.r, I let them know it. 
8. The few times I have cheated, I have suffered unbearable feelings 
of remorse. 
9. Once in a while I cannot control my urge to harm others. 
10. I never become mad enough to throw things. 
11. Sometimes people bother me just by being around. 
12. When someone makes a rule I don't like I am tempted to break it. 
13. Other people always seem to get the breaks. 
14. I tend to be on my guard with people who are somewhat more 
friendly than I expected. 
15. I often find myself disagreeing with people. 
16. I sometimes have bad thoughts which make me feel ashamed of myself. 
17. I can think of no good reason for ever hitting anyone. 
18. When I am angry, I sometimes sulk. 
19. When someone is bossy, I do the opposite of what he wants. 
20. I am irritated a great deal more than people are aware of. 
21. I don't know any people that I downright hate. 
22. There are a number of people who seem to be jealous of me. 
23. I can't help getting into arguments when people disagree with me. 
24. People who shirk on the job must feel very guilty. 
25. If somebody hits me first, I let him have it. 
26. When I am mad, I sometimes slam doors. 
27. I am alw ys patient with others. 
28. Occasionally when I am mad at someone I will give him the silent 
treatment. 
29. When I look back on what's happened to me, I can't help feeling 
mildly resentful. 
JO. There are a number of people who seem to dislike me very much. 
31. I demand that people respect my rights. 
32. It depresses me that I did not do more for my parents. 
33. Whoever insults me or my family is asking for a fight. 
J4. I never play practical jokes. 
35. It makes my blood boil to have somebody make fun of me. 
J6. When people are bossy, I take my time just to show them. 
37. Almost every week I see someone I dislike. 
38. I sometimes have the feeling that others are laughing at me. 
39. Even when my anger is aroused, I don't use "strong language." 
40. I am concerned about being forgiven for my sins. 
41. People who continually pester you are asking for a punch in the 
nose. 
42. I sometimes pout when I don't get my way. 
43. If somebody annoys me, I am apt to tell him what I think of him. 
44. I often feel like a powder keg ready to explode. 
45. Although I don't show it, I am sometimes eaten up with jealousy. 
46. My motto is "Never trust strangers." 
47. Whe people yell at me, I yell back. 
48. I do many things that make me feel remorseful afterward. 
49. When I really lose my temper, I am capable of slapping someone. 
50. Since the age of ten, I have never had a temper tantrum. 
51. When I get mad, I say nasty things. 
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52. I sometimes carry a chip on my shoulder. 
53. If I let people see the way I feel, I'd be considered a hard person 
to get along with. 
54. I commonly wonder what hidden reason another person may have for 
doing something nice for me. 
55. I could not put someone in his place, even if he needed it. 
56. Failure gives me a feeling of remorse. 
57. I get into fights about as often as the next person. 
58. I can remember being so angry that I picked up the nearest thing 
and broke it. 
59. I often make threats I don't really mean to carry out. 
60~ I can't help being a little rude to people I don't like. 
61. At times I feel I get a raw deal out of life. 
62. I used to think that most people told the truth, but now I know 
other. 
63. I generally cover up my poor opinion of others. 
64. When I do wrong, my conscience punishes me severely. 
65. If I have to resort to physical violence to defend my rights, I 
will. 
66. If someone doesn't treat me right, I don't let it annoy me. 
67. I have no enemies who really_wish me harm. 
68. When arguing, I tend to raise my voice. 
69. I often feel that I have not lived the right kind of life. 
70. I have known people who pushed me so far that we came to blows. 
71. I don't let a lot of unimportant things irritate me. 
72. I seldom feel that people are trying to anger or insult me. 
73. Lately, I have been kind of grouchy. 
74. I would rather concede a point than get into an argument about it. 
75. I sometimes show my anger by banging on the table. 
Adult Irrational Ideas Scale 
1. Jeers humiliate me even when I know I am right. 
2. I worry about situations where I am being tested. 
J. The best way to teach a child right from wrong is to spank him 
when he is wrong. 
4:. .I must learn to "keep my head" when things go wrong. 
5. I think I am getting a fair deal in life. 
6. I worry about eternity. 
7. I am happiest when I am sitting around doing little or nothing. 
8. I prefer to be independent of others in making decisions. 
9. If a person is ill-tempered and moody, he will probably never 
change. 
10. I get very upset when I hear of people (not close relatives or 
close friends) who are very ill. 
11. Crime never pays. 
12. My family and close friends do not take enough time to become 
acquainted with my problems. 
13. People who do not achieve competency in at least one area are 
worthless. 
14. We are justified in refusing to forgive our enemies. 
15. I frequently feel unhappy with my appearance. 
16. I feel that life has a great deal more happiness than trouble. 
17. I worry over possible misfortunes. 
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18. I often spend more time in trying to think of ways of getting out 
of something than it would take me to do it. 
19. I tend to look to others for the kind of behavior they approve as 
right and wrong. 
20. Some people are dull and unimaginative because of defective train-
ing as a child. 
21. Helping others is the very basis of life. 
22. School promotions should be for intellectual merit alone. 
23. It is very important to me when I do a good job to be praised. 
2l.t. I find it difficult to take criticism without feeling hurt. 
25. It is terribly upsetting the way some students seem to be con~· 
stantly protesting about one .. thing· or a.nother. 
26. It is impossible at any given time to change one's emotions. 
27. I tend to worry about possible accidents and disasters. 
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28. I need to learn how to keep·· froin being too ass er ti ve or too bold. 
29. To cooperate with others .:fs better than doing what you feel should 
be done. 
JO. Sympathy is the most b~autiful emotion of man. 
31. People who'criticize the government are either ignorapt or foolish. 
32. I wish that more affection were shown by members of my family. 
33. When a person is no longer interested in doing his best, he is 
done for. 
Jl.t. I get very angry when I miss a bus which passes only a few feet 
away from me. 
35. My place of employment and/or my neighborhood provide adequate 
opportunity for me to meet and make friends. 
36. I can walk past a grave yard alone at night without feeling uneasy. 
37. I avoid inviting others to my home because it is not as nice as 
theirs. 
38. I prefer to have someone with me when I receive bad news. 
39. It is necessary to be especially friendly to new co-workers and 
neighbors. 
L.to. The good person is usually right. 
l.i:1. Sometimes I feel that no one loves me. 
l.t2. I worry about little things •. 
43. Riches are a sure basis for happiness in the home. 
l.t4. I can face a difficult task without fear. 
45. I usually try to avoid do.ing chores which I dislike doing. 
46. I like to bear responi;;ihilities alone. 
47. Other people's problems frequently cause me great concern. 
48. It is sinful to doubt the Bible. 
49. It makes me very uncomfortable to be different. 
50. I get terribly upset and miserable when things are not the way 
I would like them to be. 
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51. I find that my occupation and social life tends to make me unhappy. 
52. I am afraid in the dark. 
53. Many people that I know are so unkind or unfriendly that I avoid 
them. 
54. It is better to take risks and to commit possible errors, ·than to 
seek unnecessary aid of others. 
55. I get disturbed when neighbors are very harsh with their little 
children. 
56. I find it very upsetting when important people are indifferent 
to me. 
57. I have sometimes crossed the street to avoid meeting some person. 
58. I have sometimes had a nickname which upset me. 
59. When a friend ignores me, I become extremely upset. 
60. My feelings are easily hurt. 
Project Assessment 
1. Were you glad that you participated 
in this project? 
2. Were your intensities of anger 
lessened in relation to men? 
J. Were you able to act assertively 
more often than before participating 
in the project? 
4. Did keeping the logs increase your 
awareness of your feelings and reac~ 
tions in relation to men? 
5. Other comments: 
Not at ·All 
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Some Very Much 
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Daily Log Instructions 
Every day you have many interactions with men, possibly with 
teachers, relatives, employers, andwith friends. Some of these inter-
actions elicit feelings in you ranging from very mild annoyance to 
extreme anger. You also respond to these situations in a number of 
ways fr.om saying very little to becoming hostile and telling the person 
off. 
The enclosed sheet.s will provide a log for each day describing the 
situation, what you were feeling, and how you responded. It is very 
important that you fill in these sheets each day and return them at the 
end of the week. 
Situation: Briefly describe the situation and who it was with 
(teacher, boyfriend, parent, etc.). For example: 
Spoke to teacher about grade. 
Degree of Anger: Put a mark in the column that best describes 
how you were feeling. 
1 (very mildly annoyed) 10, 20, JO, ~o, 50 
(average amount of anger), 60, 70, 80, 90, 
100 (extreme anger or rage). 
Reaction: Put a mark in the column that best describes how you 
responded. 
Passive: Said very little. Did not say what you 
thought or felt or what you wanted. 
Assertive: Said what you thought or felt or stated 
what you wanted. 
Aggressive: Said wpat you thought or felt but in a 
hostile manner. Made put down statements. 
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Name: DAILY LOG 
Date: 
SITUATION (BRIEF) DEGREE OF ANGER REACTION 
1 10 20 JO 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Pass., Ass •. Aqq. 
Scrambled Sentences 
The numbers in parentheses indicate neutral solution. 
List A 
the swat (hear) fly 
(busy) he stupid is 
are his break (tape) 
the (bounce) slam ball 
liar a (woman) she's 
(hear) I you hate 
ticket the punch (take) 
window the (open) break 
the brain (cake) cut 
grapes the (pack) crush 
me you disgust (convince) 
the (car) knife drive 
paper cut the (bring) 
the (chance) devil give him 
shoot 1 1 11 you (ask) 
egg (cook) the beat 
out blast (give) them 
him bring (here) death 
snobs dislike (meet) I 
out him (let) knock 
you 1 1 11 kill (call) 
cloth (sell) tear the 
your use fist (pencil) 
child the (question) torture 
bargain a drive (find) 
out (sort) bawl them 
the man (clothes) hang 
nails the (count) hit 
go hell (sleep) to 
your (pen) gun use 
List B 
the (see) slap mosquito 
foolish he (working) is 
hand his (shake) break 
the hit (bring) ball 
(man) a cheat he's 
hit 1 1 11 you (take) 
note a (play) strike 
lock the smash (fix) 
the (bread) heart slice 
orange the squash (taste) 
you me (tell) annoy 
the plunge (change) blade 
wood (pile) the split 
him hell (time) give 
(see) 1 1 11 you stab 
cream whip the (drink) 
alive (find) burn them 
him make die (eat) 
whiners (meet) dislike I 
him I punch (bring) 
you 1 1 11 (tell) murder 
seam rip (sew) the 
a give him (seat) slap 
(boy) the brain train 
price the cut (learn) 
them down (here) call 
his (pay) head cut off 
tacks the pound (sort) 
them (see) damn all 
your pistol (pencil) use 
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Attitudes Toward Women 
The statements listed below describe attitudes toward the role of women · 
in society which differ.ent people have. There are no right or wrong 
answers,, (>l11Y i':>pihieri:;;. You .are· asked to express your feelin!;JS about 
each. statement by indicating whether you (A) Agree strongly, (B) Agree 
mildly, (C) Disagree mildly, or (D) Disagree strongly. Please indicate 
your opinion by marking the coluriln on the answer sheet which corresponds 
to the alternative which best describes your personal attitude. Please 
respond to every item. 
(A) Agree strongly (B). Agree .mildly (C) Disagree mHdJ:yd:(i)) Disagree 
strongly 
1. Women have an obligation tobe faithful to their husbands. 
2. Swearing and obscenity is more repulsive in the speech of a woman 
than a man. 
J. The satisfaction of her husband's sexual desires is a fundamental 
obligation of every wife. 
4:. Divorced men should help support their children but should not be 
required to pay alimony if their wives are capable. of working. 
5. Under ordinary circumstances, men should be expected to pay all the 
expenses while they'.'re out on a date. 
6. Women should take increasing:.responsibility for leadership in 
solving the intellectual and social problems of the day. 
7. It is all right for wives to have an occasional, casual, extra-
marital affair. 
8. Special attentions like standing up for a woman who comes into a 
room er giving her a seat on a crowded bus are outmoded and should 
be discontinued. 
9. Vocational and professional schools should admit the best qualified 
students, independent of sex. 
10. Both husband and.wife should be allowed the same grounds for 
divorce. 
11. Telling dirty jokes should be mostly a masculine prerogative. 
12. Husbands and .wives should he equal partners in planning the family 
·budget. 
1J. Men should continue to show courtesies to women such as holding 
open the doer or helping them on with their coats. 
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1~. Women should claim alimony not as persons incapable of self-support 
but only when there are children to provide for or when the burden 
of starting life anew after the divorce is obviously heavier for 
the woman. 
15. Intoxication amcmg women is worse than intoxication among men. 
16. The initiative in dating should come from the man. 
17. Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside 
the home, men should share in household tasks such as washing 
dishes and doing the iaundry. 
18. It is insulting to women to have the "obey" clause remain in the. 
marriage service. 
19. ·There should be a strict merit system in job appointment and promo-
tion without regard to sex. 
20. A woman should be as feee as a man to propose marriage. 
21. Parental authority and responsibility for discipline of the 
children should be equally divided between husband and wife. 
22. Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming 
good wives and mothers. 
23. Women earning as much as their dates should bear equally the 
expense when they go out together. 
2~. Women should assume their rightful place in business and all the 
professions along with men. 
25. A woman should not expect to go to exactly the same places or to 
have quite the same freedom of action as a man. 
26.. Sons in a family should be given more encouragement to go to 
college than daughters. 
27. It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive and for a man to 
darn socks. 
28. It is childish for a woman to assert herself by retaining her 
maiden name after marriage. 
29. Society should regard the services rendered by the women workers 
as valuable as those of men. 
JO. It is only fair that male workers should receive more pay than 
women even for identical work. 
J1. In general, the father should have greater authority than the 
mother in the bringing up of children. 
32. Women should be encouraged not to become sexually intimate with 
anyone before marriage, even their fiances. 
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33. Women should demand money for household and personal expenses as a 
right rather than as a gift. 
34. The husband should not be favored by law over the wife in the 
disposal of family property or income. 
35. Wifely submission is an outworn virtue. 
36. There are some professions and types of businesses that are more 
suitable for men than women. 
37. Women should be concerned with their duties of childrearing and 
housetending, rather than with desires for professional and 
business careers. 
38. The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in 
the hands of men. 
39. A wife should make every effort to minimize irritation and incon-
veniences to the male head of the family. 
40. There should be no greater barrier to an unmarried woman having 
sex with a casual acquaintance than having dinner with him. 
41. Economic and social freedom is worth far more to women than 
acceptance of the ideal of feminity which has been set by men. 
~2. Women should take the passive role in courtship. 
43. On the average, women should be regarded as less capable of con-
tribution to economic production than are men. 
44. The intellectual equality of woman with man is perfectly obvious. 
45. Women should have full control of their persons and give or with-
hold sex intimacy as they choose. 
46. The husband has in general no obligation to inform his wife of his 
financial plans. 
47. There are many jobs in which men should be given preference over 
women in being hired or promoted. 
48. Women with children should not work outside the home if they don't 
have to financially. 
49. Women should be given equal opportunity with men for apprenticeship 
in the various trades. 
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50. The relative amounts of time and energy to be devoted to household 
duties on the one hand and to a career on the other should be 
determined by personal desires and interests rather than by sex. 
51. As head of the household, the husband should have more responsi-
bility for the family's financial plans than his wife. 
52. Jf both husband and wife agree that sexual fidelity isn't 
important, there's no reason why both shouldn't have extramarital 
affairs if they want to. 
53. Most women need and want the kind of protection and support that 
men have traditionally given them. 
F . air 
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Training Group I and II Transcript 
Orientation: For the next few weeks we will be focusing on 
situations and experiences in which you feel 
very angry and tend to become verbally aggres-
sive. Each of you have indicated that this 
often creates problems for you personally be-
cause you feel a lot of upsetness and makes 
dealing with some people difficult for you. 
Many of you may be finding that you are at times 
feeling hostility, resentment, and bitterness as 
you become aware of the sexism in our society 
but maybe even more often when you feel frus-
trated personally or responded to as a sex 
object or talked down to because you are a 
woman. I think we can all agree that these are 
highly annoying and unpleasant situations for 
all of us. The purpose of our meetings will be 
to understand how we may be unnecessarily up-
setting ourselves because of these situations 
and how we can approach them with less. stress to 
ourselves and with more self control and 
determination. 
Each of you has completed a hierarchy of situa-
tions in which you become angry. For purposes 
of discussion and training we will be using 
these situations to analyze and understand 
feelings of anger and to practice new approaches 
to these situations. 
In order for us to feel as free as possible to 
share our feelings and experiences, it is 
important that nothing that is discussed or 
shared in our group be talked about either among 
ourselves or other people outside this group. 
Emotions and their intensities are learned: To begin to 
understand our feelings of anger, let's con-
sider first where our emotions come from. Even 
though our emotional reactions to physical pain 
and pleasure appear to be innate-that is they 
occur in the newborn without much evidence of 
learning, most of the emotions we experience 
are a result of our learning to perceive some-
thing as good or bad, desirable or undesirable. 
The anthropological studies of Margret Mead and 
Ruth Benedict have dramatically demonstrated the 
cultural or learning basis of much of emotional 
expression and intensity. For example, 
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societies such as the Arapesh are very affec-
tionate and love children and are as a tribe 
unaggressive, cooperative, and mild while the 
Mundugumor, on the other hand, are very hostile 
toward children, have much conflict in their 
relationships and as a whole are violent, 
vengefut, and aggressive. 
Even within our own culture and life experience 
we can see how learning affects our emotions 
and emotional experience. Most of you when you 
were ydun~ children were afraid of loud noises 
or were afraid of the dark. But probably most 
of you as you grew older realized that these 
fears were groundless and were no longer afraid 
of these things. 
Since most or many of our emotions are learned, 
it is, therefore, possible to unlearn them or to 
learn to experience new or different emotions. 
How then are emotions learned?: Emotions are for the most -------
part a result of how we have learned to per-
ceive or evaluate something. If we have been 
taught or have experienced something as plea-
surable we tend to evaluate or perceive that as 
good which is followed by a pleasant emotional 
reaction or experience. The same, for unpleas-
ant emotions. If we are taught that something 
is harmful to us (Don't ride with strangers) 
we evaluate or perceive that as dangerous and 
feel anxious or afraid. If we are taught that 
something is evil or bad (Men shouldn't molest 
little children) we would perceive this as wrong 
and feel .angry. 
For example, many of us were taught as children 
that policemen are our friends and will be help-
ful so many times when we saw a policeman we 
felt good or if one approached us we were glad. 
To demonstrate how new perceptions or evalua-
tions can effect emotions, many people as a 
result of campus demonstrations, Kent State, and 
the Knapp commission view policemen quite dif-
ferently and have a decidedly different reaction 
to seeing one or being approached by one. 
Anger, more specifically: Just as emotions in general arise 
from the way we perceive or think about someone 
or something, so more specifically, does the 
emotion of anger. Most often when people de-
scribe feelings of anger, they are not talking 
about an experience arising from physical pain, 
such as someone hitting them over the head with 
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a baseball bat, but are describing a feeling 
arising out of a perception or evaluation of an 
event, such as "I'm angry because he stood me 
up". Because it is our perceptions or views 
that give rise to our feelings of anger, the 
same event may be viewed and therefore experi-
enced differently by different people. So that 
a professor announcing a pop quiz can give rise 
to a variety of feelings in the class. Now if 
you stayed out all night and feel you deserve a 
medal for even making it to class and the last 
thing you expected to await you was a test, you 
might sit there doing a slow burn, screaming 
inwardly "How can he do this to me, it's not 
fair". On the other hand, if you were so bored 
last night that you decided to study since there 
was nothing better to do and you need a chance 
to boost up your tenuous B you might sit there 
feeling pretty smug, thinking "What luck, boy am 
I glad I studied". So the event is the same, an 
unexpected exam, but the reactions are different 
depending on how it is seen. 
Here's another example. Suppose you are in a 
hurry to get to class and you are driving down 
the street and just as .the light turns green, 
someone starts across the street. How might you 
feel? But just as you are about to yell some-
thing out the window you notice that he's carry-
ing a white cane. How might you feel then? In 
both instances you are frustrated (which means 
you have to wait a couple of seconds longer) 
but the feelings experienced as a result of per-
ceiving the situation differently are entirely 
different. 
Take the earlier illustration of a person get-
ting angry over being stood up. Can you think 
of instances where this might happen and the 
person would feel differently? (The group 
brought up examples and discussed this point.) 
Hierarchy examples: Each look at hierarchy items and identify 
how situations that led to anger might give rise 
to other feelings. (Each group member discussed 
this in relation to her hierarchy items.) 
Relation between feeling angry and acting aggressively: Let's 
consider the relationship between how we feel 
and how we act or behave. What then is the re-
lation between feeling angry and acting aggres-
sively either directly or indirectly, physically 
or verbally. 
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1. There is a greater chance that you will act 
aggressively if you feel angry, and the chances 
increase as the intensity of anger increases. 
If in the example given earlier of someone walk~ 
ing across the street as the light changes, you 
are on your way to school and have plenty of 
time, you might feel midly annoyed as you sit 
there waiting for the man to cross, if however, 
you are already late for class and a major exam 
is being given, you probably would feel more 
intensely angry (60-70) and would more likely 
yell at the person, or honk your horn. 
Look at your own hierarchies and pick an item 
that is low and one ·that is high .and see if the 
probability increases that you will do something 
aggressive, the higher the item is. (Each mem-
ber discussed this with items from her 
hierarchy. ) 
2. Acting aggressively often increases the 
experience of anger. Experimental work has 
shown that when people are encouraged to act 
aggressively, in many situations this is fol-
lowed by increased levels of emotions and also 
by increased aggressive behavior. In other 
words, the more anger that you express, the more 
angry you feel and the more likely you are to 
react to situations with anger. 
Suppose your boyfriend constantly referred to 
you as "his chick". This was something that 
really annoyed you and pissed you off. You 
didn 1 .t say anything until finally one day after 
the tenth time, you really blew your stack and 
told him off. After you let him have it, so to 
speak, your feelings of anger would go up 30. 
points on your anger scale, and ever after when 
he referred to you as 11his chick" again, you 
would feel more angry and would more likely tell 
him off again. 
Women frequently report that they become annoyed 
when a man whistles or makes some snide remark 
when they are walking down the street. Imagine 
this happening to you. (pause) Now imagine 
yourself turning to the man and saying something 
like "lay off you dirty son of a bitch". 
(pause) Notice how you are feeling. (pause) 
Now again imagine the same thing happening but 
this time you ignore the man and walk straight 
ahead. Notice how you are feeling. (pause) 
The events are the same and initially you feel 
the same, very annoyed. But depending on how 
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you react to the situation you might feel rising 
levels of anger or continued annoyance. (Each 
member discussed how she felt during the 
exercise.) 
3. Even though you feel angry, it is not nec-
essary to act aggressively. This example also 
illustrates a third relationship between how you 
feel and how you act-that is, that even if you 
are feeling angry, it is not necessary to act 
aggressively-that is make put down statements or 
attack the person aggressively. Even though you 
may have felt annoyed or angry at a man making 
such remarks, you can either respond to him with 
hostile remarks or coolly ignore him. There-
fore, even though the probability of acting 
aggressively increases as the level of anger 
increases, it is not necessary to act aggres-
sively even if you are very angry. 
Advantages and disadvantages of anger and aggression: 
Advantages 
1. Since people have a tendency to become 
angry, letting out internalized feelings gets 
them in the open and the person often will tem-
porarily feel better about having expressed 
them. 
2. Expression of hostility can be very ple~~ 
surable and it may cover up or release feelings 
of depression. Anger may not be the best way of 
expressing oneself but if one has a choice 
between being angry or depressed, one would be 
better off expressing anger rather than being 
depressed. 
3. Expressing almost any feeling, the individ-
ual tends to learn something about himself. If 
a person is overly inhibited or constricted he 
is not open to the experiences of living. If he 
allows himself to become angry and upset he will 
sometimes become less inhibited, and more open 
to risks and to new experiences. 
~- The expression of anger puts you honestly in 
touch with some of your important and real 
feelings. If you ~eep suppressing or repressing 
your anger you tend to refuse to acknowledge 
that you are displeased with another's behavior 
and that you do very much want them to change. 
5. The expression of anger can sometimes serve 
as a deconditioning or desensitizing process. 
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In encounter groups clients are encouraged to 
explode angrily, this can lead to the client 
getting used to letting his feelings out and 
giving them less importance than before or else 
he may realize that he is making much ado about 
nothing and may make himself less angry. 
6. Expressing yourself angrily can sometimes 
have the effect of getting someone to do or not 
do something that you don't like. 
Disadvantages 
1. It is invariably, when looked at closely, a 
form of demandingness. The angry person be-
lieves two things, (a) I don't like what you are 
doing and I wish you ~ould change it, and (b) 
Because I don't like what you are doing, you 
should not, must not do it. I need to have you 
act better and if you don't, you are a total 
bastard. The second statement is unrealistic 
for several reasons: (a) the person does not 
run the universe and is foolish to command ot 
doctate that it must change, (b) he does not 
need, even though he may prefer others to act 
better and he can still live a relatively happy 
life if they don't, and (c) people who act poor~ 
ly to you are not total bastards, but merely 
human beings who are behaving in a way you don't 
like. 
2. Although there is a little evidence that 
anger subsides as you give vent to it, the 
opposite is even truer. In most instances, the 
more you express your anger, the angrier and 
more vindicative you become. 
3. Anger is one of the main manifestations and 
reinforcers of low frustration tolerance. When 
you are angry at another person you are not only 
saying that you don't like what he is doing but 
also that you can't stand it, that is you will 
be utterly miserable until he stops. 
~- Anger usually leads to some form of re-
crimination and penalization by the individuals 
at whom you are angry. In a therapeutic situa-
tion such as an encounter group, this might be 
very accepted and even encouraged, but in real 
life conditions are hardly the same. Tell a 
neighbor or a friend off and you have a quarrel 
on your hands. Tell a boss off and you may be 
out of a job, tell your boyfriend off and you 
might be spending Saturday nights alone. 
Session II 
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5. Overt hostility tends to absorb so much time 
and energy and to get you into difficulty with 
individuals that it diverts you from perceiving 
and understanding or planning effective ways to 
get what you want. 
6. The expression of hostility is disruptive 
in several ways. It can literally give you a 
pain in the stomach and help bring on psychoso-
matic reaxtions including gastrointestinal 
upsets, skin disorders, and heart palpitations. 
It intensely involves you in your head and some-
times in vindictive actions with people who you 
really do not care about. It detracts from the 
time you could spend in more constructive, 
creative, and enjoyable pursuits. 
Analysis of cognitive statements leading to anger: A chart of 
the cognitive statements leading to anger was 
presented (See Figure I). It was briefly 
demonstrated how each of these statements could 
generate anger. 
Review of anger model: The chart of cognitive statements 
leading to anger (Figure I) was again presented. 
Each of the statements was gone over with re~ 
spect to how they could generate anger. 
The irrational .2!. unrealistic aspect of each statement: Each 
statement was examined carefully and these 
points were made. 
"I have to have what I want now" is irrational 
for several reasons: (a) a demand that the 
world operate to suit that particular person, 
(b) an implied necessity that the demand be 
granted, and (c) an unrealistic demand that the 
wish or desire be granted at that moment. 
"I can't stand it" whether referring to events, 
people, or feelings is an unrealistic statement 
because even though events are unpleasant, 
painful, or difficult people are able to live 
through them and rarely succomb to them. This 
is an exaggeration of the situation. 
"It shouldn't be this way". This is another way 
of saying things shouldn't be the way they are. 
This stems from a refusal to accept the fact of 
being frustrated and again demands that the 
world operate to satisfy the individual's 
desires. Even though many reasons could be 
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s.tated for why it would be better if things 
were different, there are no reasons that can 
be given.for why things shouldn't be as they 
are. 
11It 1 s because of them, they are to blame". 
Subjects were handed copies of Table I. Each 
statement was read aloud and discussed. 
Rational beliefs !:!12. corresEonding emotions: Each of the 
statements in Figure I (chart) were then looked 
at to demonstrate what the rational statement 
would be and the emotion that would follow this 
belief. The following points were made. 
For statement one, the rational belief would be 
11 ! want what I want but I don I t have to have it 
now". The emotion would be mild frustration. 
For the second statement, the rational belief 
would be fl! don I t like being frustrated but I 
can stand it". The emotion would be annoyance 
or frustration. 
For the third statement, the rational belief 
would be "Thhl.gs are the way they are and · 
there's no reason why they shouldn't be even 
though there are reasons why it would be better 
if they weren't" and the corresponding emotion 
would be frustration or annoyance. 
For the last statement, the rational belief · 
would be ''Even though I don't like what he did, 
that doesn't make him a total bastard" and the 
emotion would be annoyance or frustration. 
Identifying anger generating beliefs .!£.2!!. hierarchie•: Each 
! practiced identifying anger generating belief• 
from her own hierarchy. 






Each!. practiced identifying A, BI, BR, and C in 
her own hierarchy items and rehearsed more 
rational beliefs to hierarchy item,. 
Homework: It is important that you begin to actively practice 
what you are learning in this group in yaur 
Session III 
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everyday lives. The first assignment will be to 
select one anger instigating event which occurs 
during the week and practice identifying A, BI, 
BR, and C. Also challenge BI, thinking new 
thoughts. Write this down to discuss at next 
group meeting. 
Report on homework assignment: Each S discussed her homework 
assignment and corrections were made by E when 
not correct. 
Introduction to assertive, aggressive, and passive behavior: 
Our Western way of life cultivates conflicting 
ways of behaving in interpersonal areas. A 
typical example is found in the common attitudes 
and teachings about human sexuality. Sexual 
restraint is the societal norm of the American 
middle class family, school, and church. The 
popular media, however, virtually bombards 
audiences with a different view of sexuality. 
on the one hand, women are expectedto be sweet 
and innocently non-assertive, whereas, on the 
other hand, they are rewarded for being sultry, 
vampish, and sensual. Or further, if they act 
sweetly passive they often get ignored or taken 
advantage of. Further examples of this contrast 
between "recommended II and 11 rewarde d II behavior 
are also evident. Even though it is typically 
understood that one should respect the rights of 
others, all too often we observe parents, teach-
ers, and churches contradict these values by 
their own action. 
We believe that each person should be able to 
choose for herself how she will act in a given 
circumstance. If your polite restraint response 
is too well developed, you may be unable to make 
the choice to act as you would like to. If your 
aggressive response is overdeveloped, you may 
not be able to achieve your own goals without 
hurting others. This freedom of choice and 
exercise of self control is made possible by the 
development of assertive responses for situa-
tions which have previously produced non-
assertive or aggressive behavior. 
Chart of non-assertive (passive), assertive, and aggressive 
behavior: 
The chart of non-assertive (passive), assertive, 
and aggressive behavior was shown (See Table VI) 
and the following comments were made. 
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It may be seen in the chart that in the case of 
a non-assertive response in a given situation, 
the actor is typically denying herself and is 
inhibited from expressing her actual feelings. 
She seldom achieves her own desired goals, 
allowing others to choose for her instead. She 
often feels hurt and anxious as a result of her 
inadequate behavior. 
If you carry your desire for self assertion to 
the extreme of aggressive behavior, you accom-
plish your ends at the expense of others. 
Although you frequently find your behavior self-
enhancing and expressive of your feelings in the 
situation, you usually hurt others in the 
process by making choices for them and minimiz-
ing their feelings of worth as persons. 
Aggressive behavior commonly results in a "put 
down" of the other person. His rights have 
been denied and he feels hurt, defensive, and 
humiliated. His goals in the situation, of 
course, are not achieved. 
In contrast, appropriately assertive behavior in 
the same situation would be self-enhancing for 
the individual and an honest expression of her 
feelings. You would usually achieve your goals, 
having chosen for yourself how you would act. 
A good feeling about yourself would usually 
follow an assertive response. 
Similarly, when the consequences of these three 
contrasting behaviors are viewed from the per-
spective of the person "acted upon" (the person 
toward whom the behavior is directed) a parallel 
pattern emerges. Non-assertive behavior often 
produces feelings ranging from sympathy to 
outright contempt. Also the person may feel 
guilt or anger at having achieved his own goals 
at the others expense. In contrast, a trans-
action involving assertion enhances feelings of 
self worth. In addition, while you achieve 
your goals, the goals of the individual acted 
upon may also be achieved. 
In summary, then, it is clear that you are hurt 
by your own self denial in non-assertive behav-
ior, the person toward whom you are acting may 
be hurt in aggressive behavior, neither person 
is hurt in the case of assertive behavior. 
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Assertive, aggressive, and non-assertive behavior in 
hierarchies: 
14:J 
Each subject identified an assertive, an aggres-
sive, and a non-assertive response to one 
hierarchy item. 
Homework assignment: Choose one event this week where you 
might typically become angry and practice 
challenging old thoughts and think new thoughts 
and act assertively rather than aggressively. 
Report to group. 
Session IV 
Review of chart': The chart presented in Session III was 
reviewed with emphasis on differentiation of 
assertive, aggressive, and passive behavior. 
Review of anger cognitions: Anger cognitions were reviewed 
with appropriate rational statements. 
Hierarchies: Each~ chose 2 or 3 high level items from 
hierarchy and analyzed rational and irrational 
statements and practiced assertive responses. 
The group and! gave feedback. 
Homework report: Each~ reported on homework assignment 
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